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Suspension, Hu(wo)man Rights and Torts; 
Discr iminatory Religious Practices and 
Hu(wo)man Rights Suspension Tactics in 
Remedying Feminine Suffer ing through Tor t Law 
Yifat Bitton* 
ABSTRACT 
What role does suspension tactics have in resolving highly contested 
social and political issues concerning hu(wo)man rights? When applied in 
the law and religion context, this question carries a special resonance in 
societies where religious law forms part of the civil legal system, as is the 
case in Israel. The following article explores the Israeli judicial involvement 
in alleviating the suffering women experience on account of religious rules 
and practices, as my argument pertains to the application of suspension 
tactics and tort claims with a view to protecting hu(wo)man rights. The 
article considers the intersection of tort law and religious practices as 
critically encouraging such tactics. While it recognizes the importance of 
the newly acknowledged potential of tort law to diminish discrimination 
against women, the article also cautions against the reality in which courts 
use these very same claims as a means for suspending women’s right to 
                                                                                                       
* Associate professor, The College of Management Striks Law School, Israel. Ph.D. The 
Hebrew University and LLM, Yale University Law School. Co-founder and chair of 
Tmura, The Israeli Anti- discrimination Legal Centre. I wish to thank the participants of 
I-CONS Conference in NY (2015) and The Association for Sociology of Religion 
Conference in SF (2014) for their insights following my presentations. Jacob Flex’s 
exceptional editing and research assistance was invaluable to me as well  I also take this 
opportunity to explain the word “hu(wo)man” in the article. Choosing this non-existing 
word is purposeful. Notwithstanding the fact that using the phrase “women’s rights” 
would have been the correct choice of words here, grammar wise, my wording 
nevertheless expresses feminist discomfort with the demarcation of these rights as 
relevant to women only, whereas they should be of concern to humans as a whole.  
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equality. The article further seeks to identify the mechanisms, which seem 
to evolve this opposite effect, whereby courts suspend women’s right to 
equality in contexts involving tort claims alleging religiously-grounded 
harms. This pursuit is applied in the analysis of several recent cases in 
which the Supreme Court of Israel and the Grand (national) Rabbinical 
Court have both addressed the issue. These cases regarded women’s 
entitlement to pursue their right to equality through tortious claims, to 
which the courts responded by instructing the women how to exercise their 
tortious rights. In what might seem to be conflicting decisions, both courts 
used the association between the law of torts and women’s equality to 
suspend the latter and thus excluded women from equal protection of the 
law. The courts’ recent penchant for instructing women embodies a 
dangerous legal position, which suggests that tortious claims must be used 
instead of other viable claims for equality, resulting in a de facto suspension 
of women’s rights. 
The present article seeks to challenge the elusive disposition which 
places tort law at the forefront of women’s fight for equality, but ultimately 
serves to marginalize it. To this end, the author uses a novel feminist 
application of Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical work, introducing the terms 
“state of exception” and “suspension” to conceptualize and illustrate a 
current evolutional legal stage, which renders illegal the suspension of 
rights that women endure under such “state of exception.” Finally, the 
article seeks to re-advocate tort law’s central role in the betterment of 
women’s underprivileged status in society by calling for a reorientation of 
tortious rights as independent of and complementary to other legal 
apparatuses designed to protect women’s right to equality. 
Key words  anti-discrimination torts, sex-based discrimination, women’s 
rights, Giorgio Agamben. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Discriminatory religious rules and practices affect women worldwide.1 
Their influence goes far beyond their intended community of religious 
women and “religious” legal systems.2 When woven into the legal system, 
religious rules affect non-religious women, and legal systems do not 
necessarily need to be grounded in religion to implement religious rules.3 
Liberal legal systems that espouse the separation of religion and state may 
also be involved in discriminatory religious practices, albeit indirectly. 4 
Throughout the world, a Jewish woman who marries a Jewish man is 
subject to her country’s secular legal system, as well as to the Jewish law in 
matters concerning divorce and marriage. 5  This duality may work 
concurrently, 6  independently, 7  or in a consolidated fashion. 8  Providing 
                                                                                                       
1 See Noya Rimalt, Separation between Males and Females as Gender Based 
Discrimination, 3 ALEI MISHPAT 99, 131 (2003). I prefer the use of the term “practice” 
rather than “rule” to emphasize the idea that many alleged religious rules are actually 
extremely patriarchal interpretations of Halakhic rules, and are therefore practices of 
these rules. Halakhic rules are the collective body of ancient Jewish religious laws. 
2 Gila Stopler, Note, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate 
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 154, 164 (2003). 
3 Id. at 170. 
4 Id. 
5 See RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 227-62 
(2003). 
6 Esther Tager, The Chained Wife, 17 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 425, 437 (1999). In the U.S., 
divorce is generally a state matter, and requiring a Jewish husband to grant a divorce (get) 
in particular is considered a religious matter to be settled by a Jewish religious court 
regardless of civil divorce procedures. Id. In spite of this, the majority of pertinent 
jurisprudence in the state of New York operates under the provisions of the Removal of 
Barriers to Remarriage statute enacted on August 8, 1983 (also known as the New York 
get Law). See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 243 (1984). This law requires both parties to state or 
affirm that they have removed all barriers to the other party's ability to remarry, and thus 
allowing New York courts to prevent a civil divorce until all religious barriers have been 
removed. See Tager, supra, at 445 (for further analysis).  
7 See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Dareinté 1877 S. 
Jur. I 27 (Fr.) (where a Jewish husband was first compelled to grant his wife a religious 
divorce (get), stating that she had suffered an inexcusable deprivation of her liberty to 
marry, and thus accruing harm to her freedom of conscience. The court further ruled that 
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women with a medium for addressing the consequential harm of 
discriminatory religious rules is therefore highly significant in advancing 
the global quest for gender equality, and in alleviating the costs that this 
harm imposes on women. 
Despite this crucial need, history suggests that traditional endeavors in 
both the legal and political spheres have failed to provide sufficient 
protection to women affected by religious rules.9 As a result, a group of 
Israeli feminist legal scholars and human rights lawyers recently developed 
a method of protecting women against gender-based suffering by applying a 
cutting-edge interpretation of tort law theory and practice. 10  More 
specifically, these scholars and practitioners have formulated theoretical and 
doctrinal venues for the pursuit of this empowering process. 11  Feminist 
legal scholars maintain that tort law may potentially redress, and ultimately 
abolish, the “public” harm imposed by public state law and suffered by 
women as a result of discriminatory religious rules, despite tort law’s 
“private” nature as a branch of law.12 
Religious law and tort law have, in the past, intersected in three main 
types of cases: (1) tort claims arising from the misuse of normally 
acceptable religious rules; (2) cases where religious settings serve as venues 
                                                                                                       
the granting of a divorce is of a civil character meant to protect a woman's liberties). See 
generally H. Patrick Glenn, Where Heavens Meet: The Compelling of Religious Divorces, 
28 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 15 (1980) (for further analysis). 
8  Stopler, supra note 2, at 171. 
9 See Frances Raday, Women's Human Rights: Dichotomy between Religion and 
Secularism in Israel, 11 ISR. AFF. 78, 87 (2005). 
10 See Yifat Bitton, Transformative Feminist Approach to Tort Law: Exposing, 
Changing, Expanding—The Israeli Case, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 221, 225 (2014) 
(for details regarding these activists’ individuals and groups).  
11  See David Bleich, Modern Day Agunot, A Personal Remedy, 4 JEWISH L. ANN. 167, 
167–87 (1981); see also Susan Weiss, Israeli Divorce Law: The Maldistribution of 
Power, Its Abuses, and the ‘Status’ of Jewish Women, in MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER, 
JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY 53 (Rachel Elior ed., 2004). 
12 Yifat Bitton, Public Hierarchy – Private Harm: Negotiating Divorce within Judaism, 
in (RE)INTERPRETATIONS: THE SHAPES OF JUSTICE IN WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE 61 (Laurel 
S. Peterson & Lisa Dresdner eds., 2008). 
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for inflicting harms on believers; 13 and (3) religious practices that become 
injurious and actionable per se. This article will introduce a fourth and 
much less known intersection of these laws.14 
Sharing the sentiment that tort law can, and should, serve as a tool for 
combatting discrimination, I will argue that tortious entitlements should be 
used to promote and further protect hu(wo)man rights undermined by 
religion. Tortious entitlements must not be suspended or be used for 
suspension of wo(hu)man rights. In activating the novel feminist 
mechanism of reading torts anew for the betterment of women, the notion of 
tort law as an independent and complementary means for securing women’s 
right to equality and autonomy alongside its function as an alternative to 
other problematic legal settings should bind the courts. Such perception of 
tort law will provide women the discretion to make strategic decisions with 
regard to whether they should utilize tort law. Conversely, if this use of tort 
law is misunderstood, tort claims for the betterment of women might turn 
into a double-edged sword and work against women and the struggle for 
securing their human rights. 
Tort law also intersects with religion in ways that are more tenuous. For 
example, religious practice can be a yardstick for reasonableness in the 
determination of negligence.15 
                                                                                                       
13 See generally Thomas F. Taylor, Clergy Malpractice: Avoiding Earthly Judgment, 5 
BYU J. PUB. L. 119, 119–40 (1991); see generally Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual 
Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809, 809–895 
(2007); see generally Emily C. Short, Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the 
Parish - Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. 
REV. 183, 183 (2004) (for the important role torts have played in the fight against this 
phenomenon).  
14 An example of such a practice is “disciplinary actions” taken by the church and its 
congregation against one of its members in the course of an alleged Christian 
indoctrination that can be highly harmful to this member. See, e.g., Church Liability for 
Torts, LAW & CHURCH 1 (1989) (for an example of such a practice). 
15 However, no systematic gender based characteristics were identified in the latter cases. 
See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 519 ([N.J. Super.] 1974) (where 
a minor plaintiff’s mother refused the administration of a blood transfusion due to her 
beliefs as a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses).  
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The identification of tort law’s suitability to the gender-equality battle 
has led to an increasing interest in crafting a newly established and 
thoughtfully structured practical use of tort law.16 This perception of tort 
law has, however, changed gradually in the past two decades in common 
law systems that embraced the usage of tort law for the betterment of 
women—to a point where this utilization no longer faces questioning and is 
even considered natural.17 This strategic feminist move, as envisioned by 
feminist scholars18 and practiced by torts lawyers, was meant to achieve 
three goals. 
First, to compensate women for the harm inflicted upon them through 
discriminatory religious practices with a potential for the imposition of tort 
liability (as in the practices of Jewish men maliciously refusing a bill of 
divorcement (hereinafter: get) or the coercive confinement of Jewish 
women to segregated spaces in the public sphere, See infra).19  
Second, after tortious liability becomes a real possibility, the inherent 
deterrent effect tort law has on tortfeasors is expected to create large-scale 
social change where the entities facilitating such harmful practices, rather 
than the particular defendants, become economically motivated to avoid the 
harmful practice and the system as a whole is “remedied.” 
Third, in cases where religious authorities specifically are involved in 
facilitating the harm, the imposition of tortious liability has the potential of 
spurring these (exclusively male) authorities (i.e., rabbis) to reinterpret 
discriminatory religious rules in a manner that would be less harmful to 
women. In other words, the use of tortious claims to compensate women for 
                                                                                                       
16 See Bitton, supra note 10, at 230.  
17  See id. at 241 (for a description of the process); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS & 
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1–2 
(2010) (for the legitimacy and justification of this view of tort law).  
18  See Weiss, supra note 11, at 53; see generally Yifat Bitton, Reclaiming Power? Tort 
Claims of Women Victims of Sexual Violence, in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY 
130-50 (Natti Ronel et al. eds., 2008) (explores the envisioning of tort law as a means to 
combat sexual violence against women). 
19 Infra, on pp. 678-90 (segregation and Get oppression).  
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the harmfulness of discriminatory religious rules has the potential to 
encourage the revisiting of these rules from within the religious system, and 
thus ensure relief to as many groups of women as possible.20 This legal 
paradigm suggests a path whereby feminist activism can establish a 
dialogue with religion rather than its overall rejection, as is often 
characteristic of the intersection of these cultural institutions.21 The cases 
discussed in this article promulgate claims that alter fundamental 
conservative accounts in current tort law that is rooted in a masculine 
epistemological framework, whereby the suffering of women still mostly 
remains unchallenged.22 
Israel saw a period in which a growing number of tort cases have been 
decided in favor of women who brought their grievances before Israeli civil 
courts for sustained harms inflicted by religious practices. 23  Civil court 
decisions from across the nation have only recently awarded compensation 
to women plaintiffs seeking damages for discrimination by sex segregation 
tactics used during burial ceremonies, on flights, and in buses.24 In light of 
the success in these tort cases, the feminist mission of harnessing tort suits 
to combat women’s discrimination has seemingly been accomplished. Or 
has it? 
                                                                                                       
20 As mentioned above, many women’s religious compliance do not necessarily emanate 
from religious beliefs.  
21 See Bitton, supra note 12, at 62. 
22 See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 
575, 575-76 (1993) (for early writings on the topic); see FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
TORT LAW 1-13 (Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley eds., 2012) (for the second 
generation of feminist critique of torts).  
23 See Raday, supra note 9.  
24 File No. 3342-03-12 Small Claims (Netanya), Rosit Davidian v. Chevra Kdisah 
Kadisha (2012) (Isr.); File No. 19480/05 Kfar Sava Family Court, Jane Doe v. the Estate 
of John Doe, (Isr.); File No. 30560/70 Rishon LeTzion Family Court, H.Sh v. H.A, (Isr.); 
File No. 6743/02 Kfar Sava Family Court, K. v. K., (Isr.).  
676 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Following a few prosperous years for Israeli women seeking redress for 
their religious-based discrimination injuries,25 recent years have seen the 
emergence of alarming signs of retreat manifesting in the suspension of 
women’s human rights entitlements. This retreat is particularly evident in 
two legal contexts: family law and constitutional law. In the family law 
context, prevalent are cases—to the extent they could be considered a 
reformative trend—in which women sued their husbands for refusing to 
grant a get, and the harm this refusal caused.26 After years of trying the 
divorce cases of women who simultaneously pursued tort suits and divorce 
suits against their husbands, rabbinical courts have recently compelled 
women employing both family and torts routes to relinquish their civil tort 
suits.27 If the women refuse, they risk having their family law-based case 
against their recalcitrant husbands suspended by the rabbinical court. 28 
These women are thus in the impossible position of having to choose which 
of their rights should be suspended: their human right to be freed from their 
captive marriage or their legal right to exhaust a tort claim emanating from 
their suffering as marriage-prisoner. 
In the constitutional context, a covert version of either the suspension of a 
human right in favor of a legal right to tort claim, or conversely, the 
suspension of a right to tort claim in favor a human right is identifiable. In a 
series of recent decisions, the Israel Supreme Court suspended the women’s 
right to equality when infringed by religion.29 In the first decision, Regan v. 
                                                                                                       
25 File No. 9101/00 Jerusalem Family Court, K.S. v. K.P, (Isr.) (for the most seminal 
among a mounting number of such cases).  
26 See John C. Kleefeld & Amanda Kennedy, ῾ A Delicate Necessity’: Burker v. 
Marcovitz and the Problem of Jewish Divorce, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 205, 208 (2008) (for 
the overview). 
27 Rabbinical courts perceive any involvement in marriage and divorce issues as 
wrongfully interfering with their exclusive jurisdiction over these matters, as provided to 
them in Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law. Marriage and 
Divorce Law, 1953- [1953] 7 LSI 139 (Isr.); see infra note 32 and accompanying text.  
28 See infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the way in which rabbinical 
courts halt divorce cases of women who pursue tort claims against their husbands). 
29 See infra, pp. 684-97 (segregation and Get oppression).  
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Ministry of Transport, the court refrained from banning the usage of sex-
segregated buses in Israel.30 Rather than order the abolition of this practice 
altogether, as constitutional law mandates,31 the court advised women who 
find this discriminatory practice offensive to use their tortious right to sue.32 
While such “court counseling” is well intentioned, and to some extent 
encouraging, it fails to protect women’s right to equality. Furthermore, it is 
legally offensive because instead of the law protecting women, it excludes 
women and suspends women's constitutional rights.33 Instead, the courts 
required women to exhaust all private means for receiving ex-post 
compensation for discriminatory acts inflicted upon them.34 In Bizchutan v. 
Yom L'Yom, it was a religious women’s legal right to be elected to 
Parliament that the court failed to protect. 35 In that case, the court refused to 
order a religious newspaper to publish the political advertisements of a 
newly established women-inclusive religious party. The newspaper had 
refused to publish the advertisement due to alleged “religious constraints” 
prohibiting women from participating in political life.36 
This article proceeds in three parts: Part II introduces the two 
intersections of tort law in which Israel’s highest courts have evidently 
affected the suspension of hu(wo)man rights. Part III uses Giorgio 
Agamben’s philosophical work, drawing mainly on two of his eminent 
                                                                                                       
30 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 566, 568 (2008) (Isr.). 
31 This statement is relevant despite raging criticism of constitutional law's failure to 
satisfactorily protect women's rights. See Jill Hasday, Women's Exclusion from the 
Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2013) (for the U.S. 
legacy); see also Raday, supra note 9 (for Israeli legacy). 
32 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 562-63 (2008) (Isr.). 
33 See infra Part III (suspension identified using feminist analysis of Giorgio Agamben's 
philosophy). 
34 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport PD 64, 530, 562-63 (2008) (Isr.). 
35 See generally TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom (2015) (Isr.); see generally TA 
25435-03-15 Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom (2015) (Isr.); see generally HCJ 1868/15 Yom 
L'Yom v. Bizchutan (2015) (Isr.) (The Israeli Supreme Court's reversal of the district 
court's decision). 
36 TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *2-3 (2015) (Isr.); TA 25435-03-15 
Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom, *1, *3 (2015) (Isr.). 
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notions of “state of exclusion” and “suspension,” to illustrate three 
evolutional stages of feminist-legal development: exclusion, lawlessness, 
and suspension. By engaging with Agamben’s work, I criticize the stage of 
suspension, and focus on establishing the much-needed distinction between 
illegal suspension and legitimate referral of plaintiffs by courts to utilize 
legal tools other than the ones brought before them. Finally, Part IV 
reinforces the account of tort law as a tool for enhancing hu(wo)man rights 
by engaging with theories of tort law that advocate using it to complement, 
rather than to exclude, other legal tools already serving to shield hu(wo)man 
rights. 
II. RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION, SECULAR SUSPENSION 
A. Torts and/vs. Family Law 
Judaism exposes women to the risk of having a “recalcitrant husband”— 
a husband who refuses to grant a get to his wife. This seemingly “religious” 
problem is particularly acute and distinctively “legal” in Israel since the 
state has incorporated Jewish tradition into its secular law.37 In order to 
better understand the pragmatic (political) motivations of both the 
rabbinical courts and the Supreme Court in the case of referrals38  as a 
method of suppression, a brief overview of the consolidated Jewish and 
secular civil law system employed in Israel is required. This context 
concerns religiously grounded discriminatory practices that inflict harms 
upon women, by allowing husbands to hold their wives captive and by 
allowing their forced segregation in public spaces. 
                                                                                                       
37 Marriage and Divorce Law, 1953-1953, 7 LSI 139 (Isr.) (The Israeli secular legal 
system has embraced Jewish law for regulating the marriage and divorce of Israeli Jews, 
granting sole jurisdiction over these matters to the state rabbinical courts who apply 
religious Jewish rulings).  
38  The term "referral" is used here to describe an adjudicative method whereby a court 
receives a case and decides to refer it to another court due to lack of jurisdiction.  
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In the Israeli system, rabbinical courts hold exclusive jurisdiction on 
divorce issues.39 However, civil family courts hold exclusive jurisdiction 
over tort claims between family members.40 State law has embraced the 
unequal structure of the Jewish divorce where the completion of the divorce 
proceedings is uniquely conditional upon the husband’s agreement to a 
get.41 Husbands often use this unequal gender disposition to exploit their 
power by extorting financial and custodial concessions from their wives or 
by simply preventing their wives from remarrying.42 A tortious perspective 
on this circumstance offers a theoretical platform for compelling the 
husband to pay for not granting the get.43 The husband’s refusal to grant a 
get, and specifically the unreasonable manner of his refusal, violates a duty 
of care towards his wife under the negligence doctrine. Negligence law 
indeed may impose liability on a husband who negligently abuses his 
relative superiority over his wife.44 Moreover, the husband’s refusal to grant 
a get with the full knowledge that doing so impinges upon a woman’s right 
to marriage autonomy goes beyond recklessness and may be construed as 
the intentional infliction of harm, an element of moral guilt. 45  The 
imposition of liability on the husband, therefore, does not amount to 
unwanted interference with his right to freedom of religion, which will 
                                                                                                       
39 Court for Family Affairs Law, 5755-1995, SH No. 1537 p.393 (Isr.) (The definition of 
"divorce issues,” however, was strictly interpreted by the Israel Supreme Court as 
granting exclusivity to rabbinical courts only in matters concerning the validity and 
procedure of the divorce). 
40 Id.; see also, HCJ 6103/93 Levi v. Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(4) PD 591 (1994) 
(Isr.).  
41 Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between Tort Law and 
Religious Family Law: The Israel Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 281 (2009). 
42 See id. at 282. 
43 See id. at 284. 
44 Yifat Bitton, Protecting Equality through Torts and Imposing Negligence Liability 
within Power Relations, 37 MISHPATIM 145, 179-82 (2008). 
45 See generally Daniel Givelberg, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits 
of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 45–49 (1982) (explicates the focus of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort on "outrageousness"). 
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stand uninterrupted as long as he exercises it reasonably. Particularly, the 
husband’s rights are not infringed since paying for the harmfulness 
embedded in a person’s privilege does not amount to prohibiting its 
execution by the payer.46 Such an intent, driven by the desire to either gain 
advantageous alimony arrangements or simply inflict suffering as a form of 
cruelty, justifies a claim for damages by the woman.47 
Tort suits against recalcitrant husbands carry the risk of being seen as a 
threat to the legitimacy of the eventual get from a religious standpoint. In a 
nutshell, this perception of threat refers to the assertion that imposing 
tortious liability on a husband might pressure him towards granting the 
divorce under duress, which might invalidate the divorce as lacking the 
religious mandatory consent component.48 Coercing the husband to grant 
the divorce is only allowable under special circumstances in Jewish law, 
and a tort suit is not among them.49 Granting a coercive divorce poses a 
significant religious difficulty, which bears legal implications. This 
difficulty is primarily because a divorce granted under duress endangers the 
status of the wife’s future offspring. In a case where a divorce is considered 
or suspected to be given under duress, the wife is still deemed to be married 
to her recalcitrant husband, meaning that any children that she would have 
with another man would be considered mamzers, who may only marry 
another Mamzer or a convert to Judaism.50 Moreover, this derogatory status 
is hereditary, and the children of mamzers retain the mamzers status for 
seven generations.51 Mortified by the potential realization of this scenario, 
                                                                                                       
46 See Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 297. 
47 See Steven F. Friedell, The First Amendment and Jewish Divorce: A Comment on 
Stern v. Stern, 18 J. OF FAM. L. 525, 532 (1980); see also Barbara J. Redman, Jewish 
Divorce: What Can be Done in Secular Courts to Aid The Jewish Woman?, 19 GA L. 
REV. 389, 417 (1985).  
48 Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the 
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 331 (1992).  
49  See Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 289. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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some feminists have suggested that Rabbis could be reasonably expected to 
endorse deviation from the conservative and stringent interpretation of 
Jewish divorce rules of granting a get.52 
The feminist hope is to witness an adherence to particular sources within 
Jewish law—traditionally neglected and overlooked—that could support 
such a deviation and release Jewish women from the unfair burden of the 
rabbinical divorce system.53 Nevertheless, rabbinical courts’ increasingly 
retaliatory tendencies towards tort claims for bettering women’s position in 
relation to their recalcitrant husbands have shattered the feminist hope 
embedded in them.54 A series of cases were recently brought before the 
rabbinical court where the women litigants were also engaged or intending 
to engage in tort claims against their recalcitrant husbands in the civil 
family court. The rabbinical judges ordered a suspension of the rabbinical 
case before them until the women declared that they would surrender the 
civil suit. 55  The rabbinical court excused its decisions as bound by the 
concern that such a claim would endanger the divorce’s legitimacy due to 
the coercive nature of tortious compensation. 56  The rabbinical courts 
ordered the suspension of the women’s right to a religious ruling concerning 
their personal status until they either withdrew their tort claim or otherwise 
committed themselves to not pursuing such claims in the future.57 Using 
their power over women litigants, the rabbinical courts forced women to 
                                                                                                       
52 I myself had hoped for such a positive development. See Yifat Bitton, Feminine 
Matters, Feminist Analysis and the Dangerous Gap between Them, 28 TEL AVIV L. REV. 
871, 896–97 (2005). 
53 See id. at 885–86. 
54 Yehiel S. Kaplan, Tort Liability of Recalcitrant Husbands in Light of Jewish Law: 
from Controversy between Rabbinical and Secular Courts to Peaceful Compromise, 6 
FAM. UNDER L. REV. 263, 268 (2013–2014). 
55 Such cases are becoming more and more prevalent in the last five years, as the 
numerous examples in Kaplan's article indicate. See Kaplan, supra note 54, at 284–93. 
56 Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 297. 
57 By carefully reviewing rabbinical courts’ rhetoric, it is possible to identify the 
abridgement of their jurisdiction by civil family courts as the real basis for their decisions 
in these matters.  
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“choose” between the two (non-)options of giving up the right to get a 
divorce and pursuing the right to compensation in civil family court system. 
Women have no adequate legal protection and are deserted in the legal 
limbo of “lawlessness.”58 
This practice of rabbinical courts to force women into choosing between 
receiving a get, or pursuing the right for compensation can be illustrated in 
the Cohen v. Cohen decision granted by the Grand Rabbinical Court.59 In 
that case, the court ordered that the plaintiff—who had already suspended 
her tort claim in the civil family court in accordance with a lower rabbinical 
court’s order—had to make sure that the case be dismissed entirely by the 
family court.60 Specifically, the court ordered the plaintiff to reactivate her 
suspended tort suit in order to have the civil court decide it on its merits and 
dismiss it explicitly and irreversibly.61 The rabbinical court also announced, 
upon the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with this unprecedented order, that the 
recalcitrant husband who had refused to grant his wife a get for 10 years, 
even after the rabbinical court itself incarcerated him, would be released 
from jail at once.62 At the request of the plaintiff's lawyer and feminist 
petitioners—present author included—acting in the capacity of amici 
curiae, the rabbinical court agreed to suspend the husband’s release for a 
few more days in order to allow the wife plaintiff to file an injunction with 
the Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of Justice. 63 
Unfortunately, the rare opportunity given to the Supreme Court to hold this 
decision illegal was missed.64 Once the woman plaintiff filed her appeal, the 
Grand Rabbinical Court issued an affidavit to the Supreme Court stating 
                                                                                                       
58 The notion of “lawlessness” was developed within feminist theory. See Marjorie 
Maguire Schultz, The Voices of Women: A Symposium on Women in Legal Education: 
The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58 (1991). 
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that it withdrew its recent decision and that the recalcitrant husband’s 
release was no longer dependent upon the woman’s claim for tort remedy.65 
Upon the Grand Rabbinical court's assurance that the plaintiff’s get case 
would reactivate regardless of the status of her tortious claim, the Supreme 
Court eventually ordered the injunction’s dismissal.66 
In its decision, the Grand Rabbinical court subjected the plaintiff, and 
thus all other Jewish women in Israel seeking divorce and filing for 
compensation for their years of distress, to a multilayered suspension of 
their legal rights, taking place in several ways. First, the decision resulted in 
the suspension of women's rights to freedom of marriage based on their 
constitutional right to autonomy.67 The unequal legal setting endowing the 
husbands with the ultimate power to free women from their marriage takes 
the right away from women. When the state adopted Jewish divorce 
doctrines, which are primarily contingent upon a husband’s free will, 
husbands indirectly received the authority to suspend women’s right to 
autonomy. As such, husbands can hold women hostage. Second, the Grand 
Rabbinical court's decision resulted in the suspension of women’s right to 
exhaust their tortious claims vis-à-vis their husbands and receive 
compensation for their suffering. 68  Third is the suspension of women’s 
divorce suits—if those women refuse to withdraw their tort suits—by the 
rabbinical court, which will not take any steps towards advancing the get’s 
issuance.69 
                                                                                                       
65 Id. 
66 See HCJ 568/12 Mavoi Satum v. John Doe, *1, *3 (2013). This was ordered despite 
the petitioner's claim that her case could still revert at the rabbinical court’s order to what 
it was and despite the feminist amicus' claim that this case exemplifies the crisis women 
undergo in rabbinical courts in trying to realize their tortious rights. Id. 
67 See HCJ 7052/03 Adallah v. Minister of Interior 61 PD 202 (2006) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG%5C03%5C520%5C070%5Ca47/03070520.a47.htm 
(for the constitutional right to autonomy in Israeli law). 
68 See Kaplan, supra note 54. 
69 Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 290. 
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B. Torts and/vs. Constitutional Law 
The second legal context that has forced women to suspend their tortious 
right is the religious practice of sex segregation in the public sphere. Unlike 
the clearly negative repercussions arising from the divorce setting, the 
constitutional context may, at first glance, seem to do the opposite. More to 
the point, when it comes to sex-segregated religious practices, where a 
separation of men and women occurs based on religious justifications in 
public areas or on public transportation, women are in a stronger legal 
position. Specifically, Jewish law has a narrow foothold when it comes to 
its use as justification for an allegedly legally protected rule of tolerance 
towards religiously grounded sex-segregation. Sex-segregation practices are 
markedly different from the consolidation of Jewish and secular law 
dominating the case of marriage and divorce.70 Indeed, when faced with 
arguments concerning the freedom of religion and religious practices as 
justification for the imposition of religious prohibitions in the public sphere, 
Israeli courts tread very carefully.71 The courts in Israel typically prefer 
focusing on interpretations and distinctions grounded in secular 
justifications and emphasize cultural autonomy when allowing such 
impositions to persist.72 Therefore, Israeli women seeking protection from 
                                                                                                       
70 REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL TEAM OF INQUIRY ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE 
SEGREGATION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 60–67 (2013), 
http://index.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/DochHadaratNasim.pdf. 
71 HCJ 98/54 Lazarovitz v. Food Controller, 1956 PD 10, 40, 55–56 (1954) (Isr.); HCJ 
122/54 Axel v. The Mayor, Councilors and Residents of Netanyah, 1954 PD 8, 1524, 
1535-37 (1954) (Isr.) (In both cases the Israel Supreme Court has restricted the executive 
branch from employing religious justifications as primary considerations in an 
administrative context). 
72 HCJ 531/77 Baruch v. Tel Aviv Dist. Traffic Controller 1977 PD 32(B) 160, 163 
(1977) (In Baruch, the Supreme Court, following riots by ultra-orthodox Jews demanding 
the closure of certain roads to vehicular traffic on the Sabbath, allowed this closure 
arguing it was meant to prevent harm to the sentiments of religious communities); HCJ 
166/71 Halon v. The Mayor of the Local Council of Ussafiyah 1971 PD 25(B) (1971) (In 
Halon, a café was restricted from playing "western" music or serving alcohol by the local 
council of the Druze village of Isfiya. Despite these restrictions with clearly religious 
origins, the Supreme Court insisted on treating the issue as cultural rather than religious, 
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forced sex-segregation are allegedly more naturally and easily entitled to 
legal relief. 
C. Religiously Grounded Sex-Segregation in Israel – An Overview 
Sex-segregation is not unknown to Israeli society, which employs the 
practice extensively, and mainly in educational, army, health care, and 
recreational settings. 73  Under the religious sex-segregation practice in 
question, women were required to board the bus from the back door and sit 
in the back of the bus, while men were to board from the front door and sit 
in the front seats. 74  Sex-segregation is basic and primordial; 75  it is as 
conclusive and brutal as it is “natural” and unquestionable, as long as men 
are generally and visibly “different” from women. 76  Its “naturalness” 
notwithstanding, sex-segregation is generally perceived as unconstitutional 
based on its breach of a person’s right to equality.77 In Israel, the notion of 
sex-segregation has been employed by feminist legal scholars and lawyers 
in two conceptual paths. One claims that sex-segregation constitutes a 
breach of women’s right to equality, which under Israeli constitutional law 
derives from the women’s constitutional right to dignity.78 While the other 
                                                                                                       
justifying the restrictions as acts intended to preserve the characteristics of the village, 
and protect its residents' culture).  
73 Michal L. Allon, Gender Segregation, Effacement, and Suppression: Trends in the 
Status of Women in Israel, 22 DIG. MIDDLE E. STUD. 276, 284 (2013); Yael Tamir, 
Siding with the Underdogs, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 48 (Joshua 
Cohen et al. eds., 1999).  
74 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 540 (2008) (Isr.). 
75 The term “sex,” and not “gender,” segregation is used here to denote the bluntness of 
referring to a person’s biological sexual characteristics as the object of this tactic. 
76 David S. Cohen, Keeping Men "Men" and Women Down: Sex Segregation, Anti-
essentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 509, 517 (2010). 
77 Id. at 553. 
78 HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def., PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.), 
http://www.dindayan.com/rulings/94045410.z01.pdf. The right to equality, since the 
enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, has become elevated to be a 
principle of constitutional status as the right to equality is interpreted to be derived from 
the Right to Dignity. See id. at 43; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
(5752-1992) (Isr.). Both accounts render religiously grounded segregation as an offense 
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claims that sex-segregation breaches the women’s right to autonomy.79 Be 
that as it may, both rights are protected under Israeli constitutional law and 
warrant the intervention of the court. Besides being unconstitutional, sex-
segregation contributes substantially to strengthening the dominance of men 
over women, as well as the dominance of masculinity over femininity.80 
These dominances, in return, reinforce hegemonic masculinity as the 
preferred masculinity, and derogate non-hegemonic masculinity, which is in 
itself more egalitarian to women and more respectful of their humanistic, 
rather than sexist, being.81 
Regardless of their prevalence in liberal states, such as Israel, which 
declaratively espouse sex equality, 82  when stemming from religiously 
grounded rules, sex-segregation has a much farther goal in mind than its 
“secular” counterpart, which “merely” aims to separate the sexes. 83 
Religious sex-segregation is meant to result in the disappearance of the 
female body from the public space altogether,84 and is therefore far more 
dangerous to women’s equality and illegal by nature.85 To illustrate this 
                                                                                                       
that some consider tantamount to sexual harassment. See HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister 
of Def., supra.; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra.  
79 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 579 (2008) (Isr.) (Joubran, J., 
concurring); Rimalt, supra note 1, at 104.  
80 See Cohen, supra note 76, at 522–24. 
81 See generally Zvi Trigger, Segregation between Men and Women as Sexual 
Harassment, 35 IYUNEY MISHPAT 703, 740 (2013) (shows the correlation between a 
woman's autonomy and her human, as opposed to sexual, being). 
82 See infra p. 715 and accompanying notes 231–32. 
83 See Cohen, supra note 76, at 516. These types of secular segregation include athletics, 
restrooms, etc. Though less harmful to women's human rights than religion-based 
segregation, many of the secular segregations warrant revision and reconsideration, given 
our gender-changing world.  
84 Allon, supra note 73, at 282. 
85 See generally HCJ 9460/08 Hitorerut Yerushalmim v. Eged, *1 (2008) (In this case, 
the petition was brought against Eged, a public transport company, who decided not to 
allow bus billboards to showcase posters presenting female candidates to Jerusalem 
municipality. Upon petition, Eged was quick to retract its decision. The HCJ therefore 
dismissed the injunction, yet stated clearly that the petition was "based on a solid claim" 
of unconstitutionality.); see generally ROSALYN DIPROSE, THE BODIES OF WOMEN 
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point, consider the fact that while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) keeps its 
elite combat units open almost exclusively to men, the IDF still employs 
female soldiers massively in all combat support apparatuses and shared 
public spaces.86 With the increased enlistment of ultra-orthodox men, the 
IDF is now creating declaredly male-only units, operating under the premise 
that ultra-orthodox men cannot serve in the presence of women, or, as 
described by Sasson-Levy, “the IDF is willing to create ‘sterile’ 
environments for them.”87 Thus, female soldiers in ultraorthodox units are 
banned from even being in the general vicinity of male soldiers, and male 
soldiers now assume female soldiers’ traditional roles at the units’ 
peripheries.88 
While this typology of sex-segregation bears malicious and dangerous 
implications, religiously grounded sex-segregation seems to enjoy the 
leveraging protection of the liberal right to freedom of religion and 
multiculturalism.89 Thus, religious sex-segregation should be interpreted in 
light of the broader patriarchal sex-segregation context. This context 
implies that the “difference” between the sexes, whether real or imagined, 
has long served as a divisive element in several respects, with the most 
prominent being the division between the private and the public, the 
political and the non-political, and the physical separation in such spaces 
such as amenities, schools, etc. 90  Therefore, religiously grounded sex-
segregation should not be examined solely from a religious authenticity and 
                                                                                                       
ETHICS, EMBODIMENT, AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 53 (1994) (for the theoretical and 
philosophical analysis of the exclusion of the female body from public life phenomenon).  
86 Orna Sasson-Levy & Sarit Amram-Katz, Gender Integration in Israeli Officer 
Training: Degenerating and Regendering the Military, 33 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULT. & 
SOC’Y 105, 114 (2007). 
87 Orna Sasson-Levy, Gender Segregation or Women's Exclusion? The Military as a 
Case Study, in CIV.-MIL. RELATIONS IN ISRAEL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STUART A. 
COHEN 161 (2014). 
88 Id. 
89 Yaacov Ben-Shemesh, Law and Internal Cultural Conflicts, L. ETHICS HUM. RTS. 
271, 274 (2007).  
90 Trigger, supra note 81, at 713-14. 
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multiculturalist perspective, but rather should be seen as a practice that 
complies with patriarchy as a whole—one that also places men and women 
in separate hierarchical spaces where men are superior. 91  As Martha 
Nussbaum puts it, “when religion and politics intertwine, it is not only 
religion that affects politics to the detriment of women,” but also vice 
versa.92 Reflecting her insight in the Israeli example is the fact that the 
religiously grounded practice of sex-segregation—which has long-standing 
opposition within the realm of religious interpretation of the Jewish 
tradition93—has gradually become one of primary importance and genuine 
virtue at the hands of the governmental institutions that have allowed it to 
flourish.94 
Despite its clear democratic foundations, Israel has witnessed growing 
practices of religiously grounded coercive-sex-segregations in its public 
spaces. The state has denounced some of these practices, while ignoring 
others.95 The increasingly worrying numbers of encounters such as sex-
segregation practices in the private sphere in funeral homes, in lines to 
receive care in HMO’s, and in the public state sponsored sphere in public 
transportation and public memorial services,96 led Israeli government to act 
upon the issue. Israel’s Attorney General assembled a “Ministry of Justice 
Committee of Inquiry on the Phenomenon of the Segregation of Women in 
                                                                                                       
91 Stopler, supra note 2, at 160. 
92 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 262 (2000). 
93 Avinoam Rosenak, "Dignity of The Congregation" as a Defense Mechanism: A 
Halakchic Ruling by Rabbi Joseph Messas, 13 NASHIM: J. JEWISH WOMENS STUD. & 
GENDER ISSUES 183 (2007) (In this study of Jewish law, Rosenak casts doubt on the idea 
of the segregation between the sexes in a much more private sphere, within the Jewish 
synagogue itself).  
94 Trigger, supra note 81, at 716 (Though known in ancient Jewish history, sex-
segregation has never been as extremely and as aggressively present or enforced as it has 
been in the last decade of Jewish/Israeli life).  
95 REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL TEAM OF INQUIRY ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE 
SEGREGATION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 9 (2013), 
http://index.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/DochHadaratNasim.pdf. 
96 Id. at 5. 
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the Public Sphere” in order to review the phenomenon, outline the causes 
for the segregation in each particular case, and suggest recommendations.97 
The committee’s harsh report unequivocally considered sex-segregation 
practices illegal.98 Ironically, the government not only avoided the adoption 
of the report’s recommendations but also launched a Ministry of Education 
program for subsidizing gender exclusive ultra-orthodox campuses in public 
universities and colleges throughout the country.99 
This evolving trend of state-supported religious sex-segregation 
ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Israel with women petitioning that 
their right to equality was being brutally infringed by these segregational 
practices, and imploring the Court to restore the protection of their right to 
equality. 
1. The Case for  Sex-Segregation in Israeli Buses – Background 
Israel’s public transportation companies provided their services to the 
local ultra-orthodox community up until the late 1990s, as an integral part 
of their routine service. Then, a Ministry of Transportation committee 
decided to provide services tailored to the specific needs of this 
community. 100  The ultra-orthodox male hegemony negotiating the issue 
with the state required, among other demands, a total separation between 
men and women in bus services.101 The obvious financial interest of the 
public transportation companies in expanding their activities to this large 
                                                                                                       
97 Id. at 6. 
98 Id. at 60-67. 
99 See generally HCJ 6667/14 Dr. Yofi Tirosh v. The Council For Higher Educ., *1 
(2015) (In Tirosh, the Supreme Court acknowledged the potential damage to women's 
right of equality by providing public funding (through the Council of Higher Education) 
to male only Ultra-Orthodox campuses. However, the court was satisfied with the council 
taking it upon itself to publish guidelines addressing the issue of equality in the funding 
budget associated with these campuses. Effectively, this Supreme Court decision meant 
that the substantive claim of discrimination concerning women's right to equality would 
not be addressed in the current budget.). 
100 Trigger, supra note 81, at 706. 
101 Rimalt, supra note 1, at 118. 
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segment of the population matched the ministry’s interests in encouraging 
public transport and generally earning political credit in the ultra-orthodox 
community.102 This position in support of segregation also gained some 
traction among legal scholars who argued the necessity of viewing through 
the intercommunal perspective of the ultra-orthodox community itself.103 
These scholars suggested that no actual contradiction necessarily exists 
between the ultraorthodox women’s right to equality, and the ultra-orthodox 
community's right to freedom of religion.104 After lengthy deliberations and 
alleged commitments to serving all passengers equally, the Minister of 
Transportation issued a permit allowing the bussing companies to operate 
sex-segregated bus lines.105 
Soon after the permit’s issuance, violent acts were perpetrated against 
women who did not comply; the rides were usually “supervised” by a man 
who ensured that women moved to the back.106 Women who did not comply 
faced verbal and even physical assaults;107 in most cases, the bus drivers 
were indifferent to the women being terrorized on their bus,108 and in some 
cases actively participated in the oppressive acts by ordering the protesting 
women off the bus.109 As a result of these abusive incidents, a group of 
social-change organizations and women—some of whom self identified as 
ultra-orthodox—petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court in 2007, asking the 
court to order the abolition of the practice of segregated bus lines.110 The 
                                                                                                       
102 Id. 
103 Alon Harel, Benign Segregation? A Case Study of the Practice of Gender Separation 
in Buses in the Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 64, 66 
(2004); A. Yehuda Warburg, The Practice of Gender Separation on Buses in the Ultra-
Orthodox Community in Israel: A View from the Liberal Cathedral, 44 TRADITION: A J. 
ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 19, 22-24 (2011).  
104 Id. 
105 Rimalt, supra note 1, at 118. 
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petitioners claimed that this “separate but equal” reasoning was 
unconstitutional,111 and therefore required the court’s intervention in the 
form of an invalidation of the license permit issued by the state to these 
publicly funded route operators.112 When the case reached the Supreme 
Court, a public committee appointed to review the legality of the segregated 
routes declared the operation illegal and recommended the abolition of its 
practice of formally segregated doors and seats. 113  Interestingly, the 
Minister of Transportation refused to adopt the special committee’s 
recommendation and notified the court of his reluctance to abolish the 
permit in question as long as the route “recommended” and did not “coerce” 
passengers to act in accordance with the segregated boarding and seating 
policy. 114  The petitioners, on the other hand, called for the complete 
invalidation of both the practice and the government permit. 115  The 
Supreme Court decided not to abolish the segregated bus lines or invalidate 
the route operators’ permits, but it did emphasize the prohibition of any 
coercive practices.116 The court ruled that as long as passengers voluntarily 
boarded the bus from different doors and willingly sat in different parts of 
the bus, there was nothing legally prohibited in the route operators’ 
activation of the bus lines.117 
                                                                                                       
111 Id. at 540. As Justice Danziger explains in Regan, by referring to both Brown v. Board 
of Education as well as to the Israeli Miller case, the sex-segregation of men and women 
in and of itself makes it a violation of the right to equality, positioning the women forced 
to sit at the back of the bus in a state of inferiority. Id. at 577–80.  
112 HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 540 (2008) (Isr.). It took 
almost four years until the petition was finally decided (The petition was submitted on 
Jan. 24 2007, and the ruling was given on Jan. 5, 2011). One of the reasons for this delay 
was an attempt by the government to have the case settled out of court. Id. at 541–47.  
113 Id. at 546-47.  
114 Id. at 550. 
115 Id. at 549. 
116 Id. at 567-68. 
117 See id. at 555-70. Given the scope of the present study, I have not fully detailed the 
court's full (and more sophisticated) decision.  
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When coupled with patriarchy and its inherent disadvantage to women, 
this invocation of individual consent can hardly be considered valid or 
genuine. 118  The Supreme Court also failed to ban the “rear boarding” 
practice, regardless of the petitioner’s claim that it has a humiliating effect 
for women.119 
While the Supreme Court applied unequivocal rhetoric in condemning 
the sex-segregation practice, describing it as denigrating to women and 
shameful to Israeli democracy, in reality, the court did nothing more than 
warn the bus companies against any coercion women might be subjected to 
as a result of religious extremists’ behavior on the bus.120 Seeking to bolster 
its dedication to equality, the court briefly counseled women to make use of 
tort claims to sue, in particular cases, perpetrators whose abusive behavior 
coerced women to sit in “women only” seats.121 
Taken alone, this court dictum can be viewed as encouraging for women 
by virtue of the court’s fostering of the tools required to submit 
antidiscriminatory tort claims. However, the dictum can also be read as 
calling for the use of tort claims to alleviate, ex post facto, the ex ante 
suspension of women’s constitutional rights. To that end, the court used tort 
law to suspend, whether temporarily or perpetually, women’s constitutional 
right to protection against the discrimination inherent in sex-segregation 
practices.122 More importantly, and as opposed to the case of the rabbinical 
                                                                                                       
118 Frances Raday, Culture Religion and Gender, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 663, 702 (2003). 
119 Trigger, supra note 81, at 734. Trigger asserts that "sneaking" onto the bus from 
behind is humiliating in its symbolic linguistic significance. The court treated this 
practice as having a "technical" nature, mainly designed to facilitate the segregation. See 
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 557 (2008) (Isr.).  
120 Id. at 567–69 (Danizger, J., concurring).  
121 The court referred, inter alia, to one of my own articles, which developed the 
theoretical framework for facilitating such antidiscriminatory tort claims. Id. at 563; see 
Yifat Bitton, Bringing Power Relations within the Scope of Negligence Liability, 38 
MISHPATIM 145, 199–214 (2008). 
122 Sex-segregation is generally unconstitutional based on its breach of a person's right to 
equality. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def., PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.). In addition to 
being contrary to the constitutional right to equality in Israel, in the U.S., this practice 
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courts’ suspension of women’s right for either divorce or a tort claim,123 
where it might be possible to allege a religious motivation, this kind of 
suspension is applied by the highest instance of the civil court system 
against the system’s own democratic values. Furthermore, the suspension of 
women’s rights under the family law regime has been notoriously well-
established from the State of Israel’s founding,124 while the suspension of 
rights in the constitutional domain was not introduced to the legal system 
before this case was handed down.125 
2. Elections and Religiously Grounded Segregation 
The Bizchutan case represents another Supreme Court ruling indicating a 
trend of ignoring women’s rights.126 Here, a group of young, vigorous, and 
brave ultra-orthodox women decided to rebel against their exclusion from 
participation in their community’s representation in the Israeli parliament, 
the Knesset.127 Strongly adhering to the notion of the public sphere as being 
reserved to men alone, ultra-orthodox religious male authorities dictate the 
systematic suppression of women from participating in any kind of partisan 
political activity, especially in its purest incarnation, the parliament.128 The 
women in Bizchutan, however, decided to challenge this ban and founded a 
women-led party to run for Parliament in the 2015 national elections.129 
Striving to utilize their community’s public media, the women’s party 
sought to purchase advertisements in their community’s most widely 
                                                                                                       
also counters the right to equality protected under federal and state antidiscrimination 
laws. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 553.  
123 See supra, main text at p. 680-82 (introducing the rabbinical courts' method of 
suspending the rights of women seeking divorce writ). 
124 HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 5, at 227-29. 
125 This is not to suggest that all the justified claims of women for equality were admitted, 
but rather to stress the fact that a suspension methodology of that kind is new to this legal 
regime. 
126 See TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1 (2015) (Isr.). 
127 Id. at 1–2. 
128 Id. at 3; Rimalt, supra note 1, at 99. 
129 TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *1 (2015) (Isr.). 
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circulated newspaper to launch their election campaign.130 Unsurprisingly, 
the newspaper’s management denied the women's request, leaving the 
women with no other relevant media outlet within the relevant ultra-
orthodox community for voicing their campaign advertisements. 131  The 
newspaper had thus brutally abridged the women’s right to freedom of 
speech based on its discriminatory opposition to the women's demand for 
free political expression. 
Armed with evidence of this abridgement, the women sought protection 
from the election committee for the blatant discrimination by the 
newspapers and expected a writ ordering the newspapers to allocate some of 
their advertisement space for the women’s use.132 The committee, headed 
by a Supreme Court justice, dismissed the case even though the justice 
implied the newspapers’ refusal was conceivably illegal; the justice stated, 
“This petition is not lacking in merit; rather, it seems to have strong 
footing.”133 He further referred to the women’s right to equality during an 
election as a “superior principle,” 134  allegedly “comporting with the 
petitioners’ claims.”135 Yet, rather than abolish the human rights violation 
presented before him, the justice decided to deny the petition.136 In doing 
so, he counseled the petitioners to instead seek redress through one of 
Israel’s tort ordinances, explaining it was the correct forum to advocate the 
women’s grievances. 137 Unfortunately, this decision was given only one 
                                                                                                       
130 Id. 
131 The Lithuanian Ultra-Orthodox community is highly isolated in Israel, and it is the 
main constituency that the women in Bizchutan come from, and were aiming for, in their 
campaign. This community has very few sanctioned media sources that community 
members are allowed to read, the newspaper in question being one of them. Id. at *3. 
132 Id. at *2. 
133 Id. at *4. 
134 TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *4–5 (2015) (Isr.).  
135 Id. 
136 Id. at *5. 
137 Id. at *4. The justice justified the decision by stating the petitioners had a more 
appropriate remedy of exercising their right under civil law to seek redress through 
another statute—the Law against Discrimination in Products and Services and in 
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month before the election itself, allowing no reasonable timetable for 
exhausting any tortious right that the party may or may not have 
possessed.138 Undeterred by the election committee's denial of their petition, 
the women appealed to the district court, which granted them an executive 
order,139 only to have the Supreme Court annul the order two days later on 
the ground that there was not enough time left to conduct a thorough 
consideration of the issues involved in the case due to the fact that the 
actual election was due in four days.140 
Under these circumstances, the petitioners not only saw the denial of 
protection against the bigotry of patriarchal subordination, but were also 
prevented from using effective media exposure they desperately needed in 
order to facilitate their constitutional right as women to be elected.141 At the 
same time, this decision affected the ultra-orthodox community’s 
constitutional right to enjoy informed elections.142  
In this case, as well as in the case of the segregated bus lines, women’s 
right to equality, generally well entrenched in the Israeli legal system and 
recently granted constitutional status, has effectively been denied. How was 
such regressive development made possible? What tools can be used to 
conceptualize it? The next section addresses these puzzling queries. 
                                                                                                       
Admission to Amusements Facilities and Public Places. 5761-2000, SH, No. 1765, 58 
(Isr.). 
138 HCJ 1868/15 Yom L'Yom v. Bizchutan, *1, *1 (2015) (Isr.). 
139 TA 25435-03-15 Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom, *1, *10 (2015) (Isr.).  
140 HCJ 1868/15 YomL'Yom v. Bizchutan, *1, *5-7 (2015) (Isr.). Although Justice 
Hendel used the formal excuse of "delayed pleading" to invalidate the mandatory 
injunction, he actually used terms implying the lack of reasonable time for deciding the 
case underlaid the ruling: "The picture arising from this description is that this delay has 
given rise to a situation under which questions of grave importance have not been able to 
receive adequate consideration . . . we are dealing here with complicated and highly 
important questions, that warrant careful and structured deliberation, unlimited by 
pressure or time constraints." Id. at *6.  
141 HCJ 8238/96 Abu-Arar v. Minister of Interior 18 PD 36, 26, 38-39 (1998) (Isr.) 
(discussing the constitutional importance of the right to elect and be elected). 
142 HCJ 142/89 Le’Or Movement v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 44(3) 529, 554 (1985) 
(Isr.). 
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III. WOMEN’S RIGHT TO EQUALITY UNDER “STATE OF EXCEPTION” 
In Part III, I turn to Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical work. Drawing on 
two of his constitutive notions of “state of exclusion” and “suspension,” I 
illustrate three evolutional stages of feminist-legal development: exclusion, 
lawlessness, and suspension. By engaging with Agamben’s work, I criticize 
what I refer to as the third stage of women exclusion from the law’s 
protection, where suspension tactics of hu(wo)man rights are used against 
women, who are being put under “state of exception.” Later in this part, I 
focus on establishing the much-needed distinction between illegal 
suspension and legitimate referral of plaintiffs by courts to exhaust the 
former's legal rights elsewhere in the legal system. To this end, I define the 
scope of “suspension” based on a three-pronged test designed to identify its 
illegality. 
A. From Lawlessness to Suspension 
The legal system has yet to abolish women’s outsider position.143 The 
modern western legal system’s disregard for women contaminates the 
system’s missions and doctrines.144 This failure to identify women’s needs 
and redress their hurts was identified as a state of Lawlessness, where the 
lack of legal intervention accounted for lack of proper protection of women, 
who needed it.145 The most prominent embodiment of Lawlessness was the 
legal perception of the home. Bound by the underpinnings of liberal 
thought, the legal system, feminists claimed, considered the home, which 
was, and to a substantial extent still is, an effectively feminine domain, a 
private haven, protected from the law’s invasion, leaving the women at the 
mercy of Lawlessness. 146  The public-private dichotomy delineated the 
                                                                                                       
143 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 17, 23–24 (2005).  
144 Nadin Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, 
in THE POLITICS OF LAW – A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed., 1990). 
145 MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 17, 106–09.  
146 Id. 
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state’s legitimate regulatory function with regard to the public, while 
ordering the state’s refrainment from interfering with private matters. This 
dichotomy was used throughout the patriarchal tradition as a tool for 
preserving the inferior status of women in society. 147  This liberal 
proposition led legislatures and courts to promulgate statutes and doctrines 
that were blind to women’s needs and suffering. 148  One such statute 
identified “rape” as only occurring if the woman was not the rapist’s 
lawfully married wife.149 The court’s refusal to apply rules of fairness or to 
enforce intermarriage contractual relations embodied such desertion. 150 
Similar phenomena is identifiable in Israeli law, albeit in a more subtle 
form.151 
The law has progressed in including women. The law still forms and 
facilitates the inferiority of women to men, but liberal law continues to 
foster more rights designed to elevate women’s status.152 Within this new 
functionality, while the law is present in many aspects of women’s lives and 
protects them against discrimination, the suspension of this protection is a 
new means for preserving women’s vulnerable and inferior position as 
illustrated in the cases introduced above.153  
                                                                                                       
147 See JOAN B. LANDES, FEMINISM: THE PUBLIC & THE PRIVATE 3–20 (1998). 
148 See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
11–29 (1992) (introducing the many ways in which the private/public distinction has 
been used to marginalize women). 
149 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 36-38 (1987). 
150 Thus, the First Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932), § 587 states, “[B]argain 
between married persons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential 
incidents of marriage is illegal.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 587 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1932); see generally Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 
N.C.L. REV. 1103, 1114–21 (1989) (suggests treating marriage as an investment 
partnership for divorce financial settlements).  
151 See generally READINGS IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. 
eds., 2007) (providing an analysis of how Israeli written law and case law are used to 
preserve the inferior status of women, and in particular under the private/public 
dichotomy discussed above).  
152 MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 37 (1992). 
153 See the cases introduced supra Part II (demonstrating women's rights suspension 
within liberal and modern law).  
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B. Suspension as Exception 
In order to conceptualize the Israeli court decisions in this article as 
having employed an illegal suspension of women’s rights, I wish to draw on 
Giorgio Agamben’s political and legal theory of the State of Exception 
(Exception). Although a thorough discussion that would do justice to the 
depth of Agamben’s body of scholarly work would exceed the limits of this 
article, shedding light on the prominent notion of Exception would be 
sufficiently effective in suggesting that suspending women’s rights 
constitutes an Exception under his theory and that this Exception is the new 
Lawlessness. 
Agamben critically conceptualizes the rise of power structures that 
governments employ in times of the supposed crises labeled as 
‘emergencies.’ 154  Declared by the sovereign under his normal legal 
authority, which is the “Legal Norm,” “emergency” is perceived to be the 
epitome of the preservation of the law, enjoying socio-legal legitimacy.155 
Temporal in nature, and therefore contrary to the persistence of a state of 
“Legal Norms,” in reality, “emergency” often ends up becoming permanent 
and unremitting.156 As Agamben described,  
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum 
worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be 
obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental 
violence that—while ignoring international law externally and 
                                                                                                       
154 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 26 (2005). An example of such emergency 
is the declaration of "war on terrorism," as employed by the Bush administration pursuant 
to the 9/11 terror events. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
155 This idea is encapsulated in the opening statement of Carl Schmitt's Political 
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty: “Sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception. Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept.” CARL 
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 
(1985).  
156 Agamben argues that today there is no clear distinction between the Norm and the 
Exception, and the modern states tend to include the necessity and the exception within 
the juridical order itself. See AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 26.  
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producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless 
still claims to be applying the law.157  
Agamben further maintains that the state of Exception is in fact the 
desertion of law to an emerging “zone of anomie, in which violence without 
any juridical form acts.”158 And yet, the state of exception is not a state of 
pure violence outside the sphere of the law. Instead, it introduces a kind of 
sovereign violence that “neither makes nor preserves law, but suspends 
it.”159 In other words, in the modern liberal state, Norm and Exception are 
bound to one another, and the important task is not to delineate the two. 
Rather, it is to understand the way in which the Exception organizes and 
articulates itself through the very notion of the Law itself.160 Consider, for 
instance, how this process played out in America’s legal reactions to the 
9/11 terror attacks. After 9/11, the Bush administration declared an 
ever-expanding state of Exception, in which more and more suspensions of 
law occurred in the name of the war against terrorism. 161  These 
constitutionally approved suspensions were gradually expanded with the 
active acquiescence of both the American Congress and the courts, to the 
point whereby ultimately and unavoidably, an exceptional rule of 
                                                                                                       
157 Id. at 87. 
158 Id. at 59; see Stephen Humphreys, Nomarchy: On the Rule of Law and Authority in 
Giorgio Agamben and Aristotle, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 331–51 (2006). 
159 AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 54. This distinction between violence and “pure 
violence” comes from Agamben’s reading of the dialectical correspondence in Carl 
Schmitt’s response to Walter Benjamin’s definition of violence as being antithetical to a 
state of lawfulness. See WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in WALTER 
BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS, VOL 1: 1913–1926, at 239 (5th ed. 2002).  
160 According to Agamben, “the essential task of a theory of the state of exception is not 
simply to clarify whether it has a juridical nature or not, but to define the meaning, place 
and modes of its relation to the law.” AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 51.  
161 Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1023 (2004); Rens van Munster, The 
War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule, 17 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS OF 
L. 141, 142 (2004). 
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suspension became prevalent and normalized.162 In Israel too, an official 
state of emergency has prevailed since the state’s establishment in 1948, 
and has lasted ever since.163 This state of emergency originally occurred at a 
time of extreme-war reality, which was perpetrated against the new Israeli 
state by adjacent Arab states.164 Ever since though, it is extended from time 
to time, mostly in order to maintain the validity of the many administrative 
orders used by the IDF establishments as part of the fight against terror and 
illegal invasions by Palestinians.165 The pervasiveness of the declaration, 
hence, goes beyond these “political” affairs to substantially affecting clearly 
“civilian” matters.166 
Agamben’s nonbinary perception aligns with Paul Khan’s idea that the 
Legal Norm and the Exception swirl and attempt to control each other. 
Khan, a prominent legal-culture philosopher of constitutional law, 
maintains that the Legal Norm will always seek to extend toward the 
exceptional decisions and to normalize them. 167  At the same time, the 
Exception will also attempt to penetrate the legal order during both ordinary 
and exceptional moments.168 
The cases discussed above illustrate how exceptions to the norm that is 
the women’s legal right are introduced by the court, and in doing so the 
court creates suspension to the human rights of women. Namely, the 
women’s right to both constitutional and family law recourses, as well as 
                                                                                                       
162 Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the "War on Terrorism": Normalizing the 
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 33 (2012). 
163 Yoav Mehozay, The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel's Emergency Powers: Legal 
Patchwork as a Governing Norm, 46 L. SOC. REV. 137 (2012). 
164 Id. at 143. 
165 ZE'EV SEGAL, DEMOKRATIA ISRAELIT, 152, 158 (1990). 
166 Yuval Shany & Ido Rosenzwieg, High Court of Justice Rejects Petition to End Israel's 
State of Emergency [HCJ 3091/99], 41 TERROR & DEMOCRACY (2012), 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-41/hcj-rejects-petition-to-
end-israels-state-of-emergency/. 
167 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 34 (2011). 
168 See id. at 54. 
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tort remedy, are reclassified by the court as mutually exclusive. Thus, this 
creates an exception, and in so doing suspends the human rights of the 
women. The realization of human rights requires that all possible remedies 
secure these rights and be available to the women. In the cases analyzed in 
this article, the suspension is far less overt in its declaration and far more 
focused in its application. As shown earlier, this suspension applies only to 
particular legal rights and is carried out within a framework that is formally 
governed by the law; it applies to tort-based rights, in realms where the 
legal system acts normally: constitutional petitions and family-related 
cases.169 Such a suspension blurs the distinction between the Exception and 
the Norms greatly by manifesting no acute or distinctive signs of the crisis 
or emergency that typically give rise to a “state of exception” that suspends 
the relevance of the rule of law. 170  In other words, it mandates the 
identification of “Lawlessness” even in situations where the law prevails, as 
long as the court orders the suspension of one set of legal rights in 
deference to another: tort law versus family law (in the case of the 
rabbinical court), and tort law versus constitutional law (in the cases of the 
Supreme Court). This triviality and banality of exclusion is well echoed in 
Agamben’s theory, where he states, “[I]n our age all citizens can be said, in 
a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as homines sacri.”171 
Using this Latin phrase, Agamben pertains to yet another anchor concept he 
developed, the Homo Sacer, a person whose life is bare and unprotected by 
the law.172 In the very same way, this realization resonates in Kahn’s view 
                                                                                                       
169 See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 534 (2008) (Isr.) (for 
suspension in constitutional realm); see HCJ 568/12 Mavoi Satum v. John Doe, *1, *3 
(2013) (for suspension in family-related realm).  
170 See Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben's State of 
Exception, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677 (2006) (for a more comprehensive account). 
171 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 111 (1998). 
172 Id. at 8, 71. 
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that exceptional moments are perceptible as less radical and catastrophic 
and more ordinary and banal.173 
In contrast to the common usage of Agamben’s notion in subsequent 
critical theory as being primarily relevant in times of declared emergencies, 
my account of the state of exception is gendered: the exception represents 
an existential normality for women. This realization warrants introducing—
this time, from a feminist perspective—two more key concepts of 
Agamben’s pivotal political structures of Rule and Exception, namely Bare 
Life and Political Existence. 
Agamben’s work, though insightful and humanistic in nature, has been 
criticized by feminists for its gender blindness. 174  Feminist critics say 
Agamben failed to identify the unique modes of exclusion within inclusion 
that characterize women’s experience; meaning that though they are 
“included” as citizens, women are nevertheless subjugated to unequal 
treatment under the law, and therefore, still “excluded.” At its core, 
Agamben’s work concentrates on the ways in which the distinction between 
citizens and noncitizens is a primary mechanism allowing a separate, yet 
legally justified, treatment of humans by the liberal state.175 According to 
this distinction, the sovereign cherishes and protects the lives of citizens and 
their inherent rights, thereby rendering the citizens’ existence political. 
These citizens enjoy Political Existence. In contrast, the lives of the 
noncitizen homo sacers and the rights they entail are constantly abridged by 
                                                                                                       
173 KAHN, supra note 170, at 126. In this way, Kahn explains how exceptional moments 
“outside” the legal norm can be perceived not only on massive scale such as in 
revolutions or similar tremendous phenomena but also as Equity: a phenomenon of a 
political decision making exception in the norm on a much smaller scale. Id.  
174 E. P. Ziarek, Feminist Aesthetics: Transformative Practice, Neoliberalism, and the 
Violence of Formalism, 25 DIFFERENCES 101, 115 (2014); P. Deutscher, The Inversion of 
Exceptionality: Foucault, Agamben, and "Reproductive Rights", 107 S. ATLANTIC Q. 55, 
70 (2008). Deutscher, nevertheless, considers this genderless theory as having the 
potential to embrace the feminist standpoint. Id. 
175 See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 
(1989) (for the way the liberal state (dis)functions within an Exception). 
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the sovereign, rendering these second-class human beings exposed to Bare 
Life.176 
The masculine inclination of Agamben’s terms is primarily a result of the 
modern political order’s masculine foundation, a fact Agamben failed to 
identify.177 Women’s social status does not align itself squarely with this 
border-identifying analysis that Agamben identifies in practices of 
differentiation and categorization of people as entertained by Western 
states.178 While the sovereign formally identifies women as citizens and 
therefore normally set to enjoy its protections, this enjoyment only goes as 
far as men’s rights allow them.179 Consider, for example, a woman’s right to 
exercise her sexual liberty and enjoy her sexual autonomy, which was 
confined to a man’s property-based right to control his wife’s sexuality as 
part of his rightful possession of her within the family. 180  This legal 
constellation challenges Agamben’s paradigm and proves that 
acknowledgement as citizens can still expose an entire group of people to 
desertion and exclusion from the protection of the law as if they were de 
facto noncitizens. 
The female experience of suppression under the law illustrates how the 
modern territories of liberal state “camps” that Agamben envisions as 
spaces of exclusion are not limited to identifiable camps designed to hold 
                                                                                                       
176 See, e.g., Joan Copjec, IMAGINE THERE IS NO WOMAN 27 (2002) (Copjec claims that 
Agamben failed to identify that masculine lives has become the foundation for the 
modern political order).  
177 DEUTSCHER, supra note 177, at 59. 
178 See Michalinos Zembylas, Agamben’s Theory of Biopower, 26 J. CURRICULUM 
THEORIZING 31, 38 (2010) (describes the typical person Agamben envisions as 
universalist). 
179 See generally Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel and Haiti, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 821 
(separating politics from the economy as establishing the gendered supremacy of men 
over women); see also JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, ONLY PARADOXES TO OFFER: FRENCH 
FEMINISTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 2–3 (1996) (during the greatest democratization 
process in French history, women were excluded from participating in promulgating the 
process’s underlying premises). 
180  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal 
Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School,” 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 73 (1988). 
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(or sterilize) women in order to “draw the line” between them and men.181 
Instead, women are put in symbolic, rather than physical or noticeable, 
camps whenever the sovereign systematically neglects to protect the 
women’s rights. 182  Women, therefore, encompass realms of Bare Life 
alongside their Political Existence within their individual bodies. However, 
Agamben’s analysis and observations are still relevant to women. His 
fascination with the conceptual field of the “in-between” and the 
“indistinction zone,” 183 where it is impossible to identify social exclusion 
without identifying inclusion at the same time, resonates with women’s 
rights. In this space, an inclusion into a political community only seems 
possible through simultaneous exclusion of others who are unable to 
become full legal subjects.184 The feminist voice does, however, call for a 
more nuanced application of this notion; one that will take the peculiarities 
characterizing the gendered experience of women and the hierarchies of the 
Homo Sacer that gender reveals within Agamben’s theory into account.185 
                                                                                                       
181 PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 238 (2008). Moreover, the experience of a “bare 
life” of women’s desertion by their own sovereign government and judiciary is rarely as 
extreme and abhorrent as in the ruling of Justice O.W. Holmes Jr. in Buck v. Bell. See 
generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (allowing compulsory sterilization of 
mentally disabled woman).  
182 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 174. Agamben describes concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany, as the embodiment of such territory, but widens it to current 
liberal states where, for example, there are areas in airports that are designated for 
refugees seeking shelter where the refugees are put outside the protection of law and 
under the violent sovereignty of police forces. Id. 
183 This characteristic of Agamben’s work is a common thread that goes beyond his 
Homo Sacer project. See PHILIPPE MESNARD, The Political Philosophy of Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Evaluation, 5 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS & POL. RELIGIONS 139, 
140 (2004).  
184 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 181. It is therefore assumed that this 
borderline "zone of indistinction" is where law and its absence render only some 
communities legal subjects. 
185 Agamben’s work, in this respect, can be seen as too dichotomous, as it seeks to 
identify the moment in which the Homo Sacer is constituted, rather than recognizing the 
continuum upon which he/she operates. See Thomas Lemke, “A Zone of Indistinction” – 
A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Biopolitics, 7 OUTLINES 8, 8-9 (2005).  
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Returning to the case of Israel, two more notions are useful for 
conceptualizing the suspension’s damaging effect to women. Agamben 
identifies two elements as accompanying the process of “exclusion” by the 
sovereign: desertion and sacredness.186 The desertion element relates to a 
lack of effective legal protection where it should have applied, while the 
sacredness element requires the excluded subject to make a sacrifice that 
strips him or her of sacred rights.187 Further, Agamben criticizes the notion 
of sacredness involved in the process, arguing it reduces living to its 
minimal experience: that of simply being alive and not being endowed with 
human rights.188 These elements manifest when Jewish women attempt to 
exert their tortious rights. First, courts’ decisions in the get and bus 
segregation embody the notion of desertion, but in a manner somewhat 
different from the one portrayed by Agamben. Here, the desertion is not 
total or formal. Moreover, it is the kind of desertion done with sympathy 
and aimed at pursuing other legal remedies available to the women 
petitioning the court.189 Second, the sacredness in these situations is applied 
through the court’s implied supposition that the women petitioners enjoy 
some rights while deprived of others, thus securing the sacredness of their 
being. Identifying the Israeli cases as demonstrating Agamben’s critical 
theory is possible by treating them as a more nuanced, gendered, and 
individualized manner of exclusion.  
In sum, sketching the feminist evolution from an Agambenian 
perspective may be described as follows: at the early stages of modern 
citizenship women fought to harmonize their formal recognition as citizens 
                                                                                                       
186 RASMUS UGILT, GIORGIO AGAMBEN: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44-46 (2014).  
187 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 8; see also A. S. Purakayastha & S. S. 
Das, Absolutist Democracy, Homo Sacer and the Resistance of Bare Life, 6 HISTORY & 
SOC. S. ASIA 111, 118–119 (2012) (additional elaboration on this status). 
188 Id. at 45; see also UGILT, supra note 189, at 44-46. (elaborative discussion of this 
element in Agamben’s work).  
189 See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 563 (2008) (Isr.). 
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with their substantive basic citizenship rights. 190  Foremost among these 
rights is the right to vote.191 Upon achieving these primary rights in most 
liberal states, women turned their focus to “secondary” rights that made 
their lives political rather than merely natural, as Agamben would put it.192 
In other words, they moved on to the next battle proving women were 
entitled to the law protecting their rights, even at times when these 
conflicted with men’s liberties. Examples of battles waged at this stage are 
ample, such as abolishing the law that protected a (male) citizen’s house 
from outer invasion, but left the (female) citizen in it to be physically 
invaded against her will;193 laws that enabled men to be excused of murder 
charges when claiming an “honor killing” of their wives;194 and laws that 
rendered a man eligible for compensation when a woman under his auspice 
had a sexual encounter with another man.195 
To support this evolutional development, I propose a third stage where 
women ask that their rights not only be included, but that once included 
their rights would not be re-suspended for any reason. This plea for 
sustainable inclusion is aimed at the adjudicative sovereign tacitly declaring 
a state of exception for women in response to identifying emergencies 
allegedly emanating from a threat to the state. In our case, it is the threat 
generated by women’s challenge to conservative and restrictive religious 
practices. At this stage, the ability of women to name the suspension of 
rights they underwent as a “state of exclusion” weakens, and therefore 
requires the kind of reconceptualization and theoretical contextualization 
offered by the present article. The cases described here work within a 
                                                                                                       
190 ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 9 (1999). 
191 Id. at 15. 
192 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 188. 
193 Estrich, supra note 152 (the law allowing men to coerce his wife into sexual 
intercourse without being perceived as raping her is one outrageous example). 
194 Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implications for Sociolegal 
Theory, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 193, 199 (2006).  
195 Sarah Swan, Triangulated Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 410 (2013). 
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women-only exception, with these women suffering a very sophisticated 
and subtle suspension of their rights. With this in mind, I will now turn to 
exploring these peculiarities. 
C. Women’s State of Exception: Referral as Suspension 
The state of exception Israel faces in the form of its proclaimed state of 
emergency allows for a subtle undeclared and normalized suspension of 
women’s rights. 196  The exception is expressed and exercised through 
suspension tactics as demonstrated in the Israeli get, bus, and voting cases, 
even though the courts claimed that women’s rights were not being 
denied.197  Rather, the plaintiff women had asked to choose one of two 
recourses available to them or were referred to alternative reliefs within the 
legal system.198 
While the get case is the epitome of suspension, since the woman was 
literally asked to withdraw her tort claim or suffer the suspension of her 
divorce claim, the segregation cases, where the women were referred to an 
alternative legal route, warrant a more careful analysis. Could such a 
referral not be considered legitimate? Arguably, referring a party to utilize 
an alternative legal route would be considered fair in some contexts, 
including lack of jurisdiction, efficiency, or aptitude in a chosen legal 
field. 199  How then should the line be drawn between legitimate and 
illegitimate referral? I suggest that an illegitimate Agembenian suspension 
is created in circumstances where the referral is done by virtue of the 
court’s political reluctance to grant the petitioner her basic legal right. 
Suspension occurs where the court has jurisdiction over the case, but 
refuses to adjudicate it and in so doing limits the scope of protection 
                                                                                                       
196 See Part IIIB (conceptualizing "suspension" of rights in liberal states).  
197 See Part II (analysis indicating that though the women's rights were acknowledged by 
courts, they were nevertheless suspended). 
198 Id. 
199 Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a 
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2008).  
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guaranteed to the petitioner but for the referral. All of the following 
circumstances apply in the cases above: (1) the court’s decisions were given 
in religious contexts, where political-pragmatism tactics often nurture the 
Israeli courts’ reluctance to assist women; (2) the court had clear 
jurisdiction over the cases; and (3) the scope of protection of these women’s 
rights was indeed limited due to the vertical referral from the constitutional 
route to the torts route. 
1. Political Reluctance to Protect the Petitioners 
The reluctance of Israeli courts to protect a woman’s right to equality is 
deeply entrenched and based in political pragmatism regarding 
discriminatory religious practices. This is especially the case in family and 
religious matters. With regard to marriage, Israeli law provides that a 
woman in Israel cannot marry outside of the patriarchal domination of her 
religion,200 and there is no civil-marriage institution.201 There is also the 
matter of reproductive rights. While an encompassing discussion of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that Israeli 
law prohibits a married couple from conceiving with the help of a surrogate 
mother outside their religion. 202  This prohibition stems from the Israeli 
Supreme Court’s recognition of Jewishness as being defined by a 
matriarchal lineage rule established in Halakhic law (or more specifically, 
its rabbinical orthodox interpretation). 203  Furthermore, an Israeli woman 
                                                                                                       
200 To be clear, this effective ban on inter-religious marriage has been shown to affect 
women more than men in Israel. See Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation: 
Foreign Men, “Our” Women, and the Law, 30 WOMEN’S RT. L. REP. 479, 503 (2009) 
(for an elaboration of this point). 
201 Marriage and Divorce Law, 5713-1953 §2, S.H. 134, 186 (Isr.); see SUSAN M. WEISS 
& NETTY C. GROSS-HOROWITZ, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE JEWISH STATE: 
ISRAEL'S CIVIL WAR 2 (2013) (for the implications of having no secular marriage 
institution on women). 
202 Certification of the Agreement and Status of the Newborn Law, 5756-1996 §2, S.H. 
1577, 176 (Isr.). 
203 Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship and Membership in Israeli Polity, in FROM MIGRANTS TO 
CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 188 (Alexis Aleinikoff & Douglas 
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who wishes to be a single-parent mother through surrogacy may not do 
so—as ruled by the Israeli Supreme Court in New Family v. The Committee 
on the Authorization of Agreements Concerning the Carriage of Embryos, 
because of the religious issues stemming from having a child from the seed 
of a man a woman is not married to.204 
The civil courts in general, and the Israeli Supreme Court in particular, 
are not ignorant or declaratively indifferent to the difficulties of women 
facing their recalcitrant husbands, and at times note their discontent quite 
bluntly. In the case of Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, for example, the Grand 
Rabbinical Court overturned an order for punitive maintenance on a 
recalcitrant husband who was physically abusing his wife as well as being 
unfaithful. 205  Consequently, the wife left the house, and the husband, 
separated from his wife for over six years, refused to give her a get.206 The 
lower rabbinical court based its decision on the violence and infidelity rules 
in order to grant the wife punitive damages.207 The Grand Rabbinical Court 
later overturned this decision, stating that even assuming violence and 
infidelity were proven, there could be no punitive maintenance absent 
forewarning.208 It is important to note that in this case the Israel Supreme 
                                                                                                       
Klusmeyer eds., 2000). The implications for non-Jewish women in Israel are even more 
absurd, while the imposition of Jewish Law on Jewish women wishing to have a child is 
infuriating. The imposition of Jewish rationales to constrain Christian, Muslim, or 
nondenominational women wishing to be mothers through surrogacy in Israel borders on 
Kafkaesque absurdity. 
204 HCJ 2458/01 New Family v. The Comm. on the Authorization of Agreements 
Concerning the Carriage of Embryos, PD 57, 419, 468–79 (2001) (Isr.). For the mamzer 
status, see supra note 49-50. In his ruling addressing the question of discrimination, 
Justice Englard went so far as to say that “[T]he Process of Surrogacy involves the usage 
of a stranger’s uterus, and in the case of the unmarried women also the usage of the donor 
sperm of a stranger. This state of affairs, we have seen, raises grave moral and Halackhic 
problems. . .this is not a matter of equality among equals, this a matter of unsameness 
among those who are not the same.” Id. at 479.  
205 HCJ 1371/96 Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, PD 51, 198 (1998) (Isr.). 
206 Id. at 201. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 202. 
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Court, after accepting certiorari, had to decide between two decisions 
stemming from Jewish Law—the first from the lower rabbinical court and 
the second from the Grand Rabbinical Court. Thus, the Supreme Court was 
not even required in its decision to go beyond religious arguments and 
address matters concerning the freedom of conscience or the freedom to 
remarry in order to grant the woman her relief by reinstating the decision of 
the lower rabbinical court. 209  The woman was clearly going through a 
quintessential Bare Life experience. Justice Cheshin’s ruling articulated this 
when he held that the plaintiff was being treated worse than the biblical 
slave looking forward to his sixth year of enslavement, when he would 
finally be set free.210 Yet Justice Cheshin, along with his fellow justices, 
refused to intervene in the Grand Rabbinical Court’s decision. Claiming 
deference to the Grand Rabbinical Court, the Supreme Court as the High 
Court of Justice refused to grant a remedy. The court stated that it did not sit 
as an appeals instance for factual and Jewish halahkhaic disagreements 
among the rabbinical courts, and dismissed the woman’s injunction, thus 
deserting her to fend for herself. 211  In doing so, the Supreme Court 
disregarded both the plaintiff’s right to equality by upholding her 
recalcitrant and abusive husband’s power over her, and her right to 
autonomy to be able to bring an end to the marriage and move on with her 
life.212 Moreover, based on the politically motivated reluctance to rule over 
matters of religious Jewish law and come into conflict with the Grand 
Rabbinical Court, the Israeli Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the case 
to give a remedy in the interests of justice.213 The Supreme Court also 
                                                                                                       
209 Id. 
210 Id. (Chechin, J., concurring).  
211 Id. at 203. 
212 Id. 
213 Infra note 228 (indicating that the Israeli High Court of Justice had clear jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the cases). 
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committed here an illegitimate referral when upon dismissing the case 
suggesting that the plaintiff could petition the rabbinical court once again.214 
Israeli courts’ political pragmatism with regard to discriminatory 
religious practices is hardly limited to the private sphere and matters of 
family life, but also extends into the public sphere and issues of free 
practice of religion and worship in the public sphere. In the Prime Minister 
Office Director General v. Hoffman case, the Supreme Court rejected the 
petition of the women who demanded permission to pray at the sacred 
Wailing Wall of Jerusalem. 215  In its rhetoric, the court affirmed the 
women’s right to religious worship including their right to pray and read the 
Torah out loud in a manner that was contrary to ultra-orthodox 
conventions.216 Ultimately, however, the court refused the women’s demand 
to allow them use of the Wailing Wall’s public space designated to women 
and went on to order the government to merely designate a separate and 
segregated remote worship area so as to not offend the sensitivities of the 
other worshippers not accustomed to women praying and reading the Torah 
simultaneously.217 
2. Jur isdiction 
The Israel Supreme Court serves in the capacity of the High Court of 
Justice on the grounds of Article 15(c) as well as 15(d)(2) of the Basic Law: 
The Judiciary. This law establishes that the Supreme Court presides as the 
High Court of Justice, which may grant injunctions and writs to state 
authorities, municipal authorities, and other persons that fulfill public 
                                                                                                       
214 HCJ 1371/96 Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, PD 51, 198 (1998) (Isr.) (¶ 18 in Justice Or’s 
ruling). 
215 AHCJ 4120/00, Prime Minister Office Dir. Gen. v. Anat Hoffman et al., PD 47, 289 
(2003) (Isr.). 
216 Id. at 298. 
217 Id. at 319; see also Raday, supra note 9, at 86–87 (reviews the Women of the Wall 
group's legal battles). 
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functions in matters where it sees a necessity to grant a remedy in the 
interests of Justice.218 
In 1985, even before what is sometimes referred to as the Israeli 
Constitutional Revolution, the Israeli Supreme Court made it clear that it 
had jurisdiction over the executive and legislative branches in applying 
judicial review.219 Moreover, the Supreme Court in its role as the High 
Court of Justice also referred to the concept of applying judicial review to 
laws in cases where those laws conflicted with the “the fundamental 
principles of Israel’s democratic regime.”220 Following this, in 1992, during 
the Constitutional Revolution itself, the Knesset passed the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty, 221  and the Supreme Court announced the 
advent of the Constitutional Revolution, stating that this Basic Law was 
nothing short of Israel’s “Bill of Rights.”222 This reasoning enabled judicial 
review and imbued the Supreme Court with the authority to invalidate laws, 
regardless of their secular or religious nature, that infringe upon the rights 
enshrined in the Basic Law.223 
Armed with these developments, the Israeli Supreme Court began what is 
often referred to as its era of judicial activism.224 The Israeli Supreme Court 
issued a string of important decisions to both the executive and legislative 
branches, which included ordering municipalities to build facilities with full 
                                                                                                       
218 The Judiciary § 15, 5744-1984, S.H. 1110, 78 (Isr.).  
219 HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 39(3) 122, 127 (1985) (Isr.). 
220 HCJ 142/89 Le'Or Movement v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 44(3) 529, 554 (1985) 
(Isr.). 
221 Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, S.H. 1391, 150 (Isr.). 
222 Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A Comparative Assessment of the 
Impact of a Bill of Rights in Canada and Israel, 53 AM. J. COM. L. 293, 312 (2005). 
223 See CA 6821/93 Bank Ha'mizrachi Hameuchad v. Migdal, PD 49(4) 221, 419-27 
(1994). 
224 To clarify, this term was often used by the HCJ’s critics arguing against this kind of 
robust application of substantive justice. See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Accountability in 
Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenomenon of Judicial Hyperactivism, 8 ISR. 
AFF. 87, 87-106 (2002); see Gad Barzilai, Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal 
Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community, 
34 ISRAEL L. REV. 425 (2000).  
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access to disabled people.225 It also ordered the IDF to open Israel Air-Force 
recruitment to women.226 It affirmed the rights of homosexuals employed 
by a national public transportation company to equal treatment;227 and even 
went as far as ordering the government to build a road connecting a 
Bedouin village constructed without permits with a school pupils from that 
village had trouble getting to.228 All of these interventions were done in the 
name of the right to equality and in order to safeguard this right’s 
constitutional cogency.229 
First, with regard to the Bizchutan case and the issue of protecting 
women’s right to political inclusion, the Israeli Supreme Court failed to 
fulfill its commitment to ensure Israeli citizens’ political expression. Long 
before the Constitutional Revolution, in the monumental Kol-Ha’am v. The 
Minister of the Interior PD decision, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that 
political free speech is part of an “inner-circle.”230 That is, that political free 
speech is the most sacred level of protected speech, so important and vital 
to a democratic society’s functioning that it must not be infringed upon.231 
Second, in the Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court case the High Court of 
Justice (HCJ) ruled that religious tribunals were bound by general legal and 
constitutional principles as elucidated by either legislation or through case 
law bound religious tribunals. 232  This allowed the HCJ to strike down 
decisions made by the Grand Rabbinical Court in case these decisions 
                                                                                                       
225 HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. The Local Council of Maccabim-Re'ut, PD 50, 19, 27 (1996) 
(Isr.). 
226 HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence, PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.). 
227 HCJ 721/94 El-Al v. Danilovitch, PD 48(5) 749, 773 (1994) (Isr.). 
228 HCJ 3511/02 The Ass’n "The Forum for Cohabitation in the Negev" v. The Ministry 
of Infrastructure, PD 27(2) 102, 107 (2003) (Isr.). 
229 HCJ 721/94 El-Al v. Danilovitch, PD 48(5) 749, 760 (1994) (Isr.). 
230 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. The Minister of the Interior PD 7(2), 871, 878 (1953) (Isr.). 
231 Id.; see also Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free 
Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 21, 66 (1982) (for elaboration on the freedom of 
political speech).  
232 HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court, PD 48(2) 221, 240 (1994) (Isr.). 
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infringed upon the constitutional rights of petitioning women. 233  In the 
Regan case, the illegality of segregating women from men was professed 
through some of Israel’s constitutive laws.234 First, this illegality is present 
within Israel’s Declaration of Establishment, which states, “The state of 
Israel. . .will ensure complete equality. . .irrespective of. . .sex.”235 Second, 
the Women’s Equality Act of 1951 provides that “Women and men shall be 
equal for purposes of every legal act.”236 
Indeed, examples exist where these principles guided the Supreme Court 
in its capacity as the HCJ to substantively, as opposed to only declaratively, 
prefer these principles over religious values in the public sphere. In the 
Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs case, the Ministry for Religious 
Affairs refused to appoint a woman to a local religious services council.237 
In the Poraz v. Mayer of Tel Aviv case, the municipal council of Tel Aviv 
refused to appoint a woman to the nominating board for the Tel Aviv 
municipal rabbi.238 In both cases, the defendants argued that under Jewish 
Law women may not sit on electoral committees or hold public office.239 
The Israeli Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that these were 
statutory public institutions, and that the women plaintiffs had a 
fundamental right to equality, thus obligating the institutions to accept 
female members.240 
                                                                                                       
233 Id. 
234 See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 48(2) 221, 240 (1994) (Isr.).  
235 Jewish People’s Council, Declaration of the Establishment of State of Israel of 14 May 
1948, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20 
establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx. 
236 Equal Rights For Women Law, 5711-1951, 1A(a), translated at 
http://financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/legislation/LaborSocialPolicy/5711
-1951_Equal_Rights_for_Women_Law.pdf. 
237 HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 228 (1987) 
(Isr.). 
238 HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 318 (1987) (Isr.). 
239 HCJ 153/87, Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 234 (1987) 
(Isr.); HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 322 (1987) (Isr.). 
240 HCJ 153/87, Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 274 (1987) 
(Isr.); HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 329 (1987) (Isr.).  
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3. Limiting Ver tical Refer ral 
Referring a petition based on violation of constitutional rights claim to 
the tort route is vertical referral; this section introduces the vertical nature of 
the referral by delineating the hierarchy between the constitutional route and 
the tort route, and it then moves to present three arguments against vertical 
referral. 
The tort and constitutional routes differ so much from each other that it 
seems almost unnecessary, and to some extent impossible, to compare the 
scopes of protection they offer to women’s right to equality. Our intuitive 
recognition that constitutional protection is far more preferable to women 
needs only little explanation. The distinctive, rudimentary, and 
quintessential elements of each of these legal fields places these fields in a 
clear hierarchical structure in which constitutional protection is dominant.241 
It is certainly possible to argue that the referral of a matter of significant 
public hu(wo)man interest from the constitutional to the tort route is a 
downgrading referral, since it causes the claims in question to become 
depoliticized and weakened in several important ways.  
First, the claims undergo a definitional transformation. When a matter 
becomes the subject of a tort claim, it transforms from a matter of public 
importance to one of a private nature.242 In other words, this is a situation 
where the court essentially privatizes a public problem. The idea behind 
using torts to affect public change is promulgated by the concept of the 
plaintiff operating as a kind of private attorney general who exacts a 
monetary cost on the undesirable behavior and thus deters potential 
defendants from carrying out this behavior in the future. 243  While this 
approach of transforming a public matter into a private claim in tort may 
                                                                                                       
241 CA 6821/93 Bank Ha'mizrachi Hameuchad v. Migdal, PD 49(4) 221, 292-319, 353 
(1994). 
242 ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 70–71, 74 (1995). 
243 See John Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV., 917, 
946–47 (2010) (for the similarity between a prosecutor and a tort claimant); see John C.P. 
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 548 (2003) (for deterrence). 
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seem benign and morally neutral, it is important to stress that this model of 
deterrence, by using private plaintiffs, exists alongside a theory of economic 
efficiency. In this theory, the plaintiff, rather than the state, is trying to 
create deterrence through a civil claim that is actually rather conservative.244 
For example, by referring the case to the tort route, the Supreme Court is 
actually telling the segregated-bus plaintiffs that under economic efficiency 
theory, the cheapest agents to prevent245 the harm caused by discriminatory 
segregation are the women themselves.246 Rather, the Israeli Supreme Court 
should have identified itself as the cheapest cost avoider, one that can 
prohibit the segregating policy altogether and prevent it ex ante.247 This is 
only true, of course, under the artificial premise that the court is just a 
neutral arbiter in private law, not a guardian of the disenfranchised as it 
rhetorically sees itself in the public constitutional context.248 This kind of 
neutrality, typical to tort disputes,249 tends to preserve existing interests that 
are vested in the preservation of the status quo of power disparity between 
the plaintiff women and the particular tortfeasor.250 
Second, the referral is not only detrimental to the plaintiffs, but also puts 
judges of lower instances (i.e., magistrates and district court judges) 
deciding the tort cases in a complicated position. On the one hand, the 
                                                                                                       
244 James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the 
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 314–15 (1997). 
245 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 67 (1970). 
246 Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of 
the Israeli High Court of Justice during the Intifada, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV., 319, 320 
(1999) (argues that courts use either rhetoric or settlement tactics to protect human 
rights). 
247 See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (for the cheapest cost avoider of the harm principle). 
248 See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 552-554 (2008) (Isr.). 
249 Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on The Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, 
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 853 (1990) (criticizing the alleged 
neutrality of courts to tort dispute parties, since tort law actually benefits hegemonic 
parties to a tort dispute). 
250 Russel Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 625 (1998). 
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Supreme Court has referred the plaintiffs to these courts to seek a remedy 
on torts; on the other hand, by dismissing the petitions the Supreme Court is 
seen as giving these practices a constitutional seal of approval, which makes 
it difficult for the plaintiffs to prove the harm element that is necessary for 
their tort suit to be successful. Therefore, the judges of the lower instances 
deciding these tort cases face the need to decide upon a tort claim for 
discrimination regarding an act that the Supreme Court just deemed 
constitutional and compatible with equality. For example, consider the 
public segregation ordeal where the Supreme Court’s decision created a 
dichotomy in which the practice is either consensual—and thus legal, as far 
as the bus company is concerned—or coerced, and hence presumed to be 
the act of a private overzealous individual who should in turn be sued for 
damages.251 Indeed, this problem manifested in a suit where the plaintiff 
included the transportation company in her plea, and the latter asked for 
immunity due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Regan and based on 
“national aspects.”252 This contention of the transportation company, that 
their allegedly wrongful actions were rendered illegitimate in public legal 
venues, illustrates how constitutional issues of public relevance are more 
suitable to resolving the case. The civil district judge who reviewed the 
Bizchutan case overtly raised this concern and the uneasiness it causes to 
low-instance civil court judges. That judge opined that the case touched 
upon fundamental basic rights such as the right to equality, the right to be 
                                                                                                       
251 Essentially, under Regan, as long as the public transportation companies refrain from 
coercing segregation directly through their employees, or through instructions ordering 
passengers to sit in segregated areas, they would be virtually immune to any tort claim by 
a woman, even one who was coerced to comply with the segregated practice. 
252 CA 2356/08 Yasur Ruth Ray v. Egged, *1, *7–*13 (2014) (Isr.) (This case featured a 
class action suit against a public transportation company operating an inter-city 
segregated bus line. Although the claim for immunity was eventually rejected by the 
court, the judge still invoked a rationale for it that would go beyond identifying the 
discriminatory practice as being illegal in and of itself.). 
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elected, which he deemed of crucial weight, and the rights that go beyond 
his jurisdiction.253 
Thirdly, such referrals to the lower courts via the tort route are not 
without practical, and sometimes significant, financial consequences for the 
plaintiffs, since pursuing tort claims demands the investment of 
considerable resources by the women plaintiffs. 254  Finally, the referral 
creates a mechanism that only becomes relevant after the fact, but creates 
no direct ex ante protections against the harm inflicted in the first place.255 
Thus, we see that much like the veritable power Agamben identified in 
his work, the power embedded in the decision to refer by way of suspension 
can render “power” to women, while at the same time render these women 
“powerless.”256 
IV. TORT LAW SHOULD COMPLEMENT OTHER HU(WO)MAN RIGHTS 
LAWS 
The notion of tort law as a tool for enhancing human rights has recently 
emerged by theorists advocating its role in pursuing equalities, even within 
its traditional corrective-justice paradigm.257 However, these theories do not 
engage with the type of challenge presented in this article. This challenge 
relates to a constellation whereby tort law is measured against another legal 
tool as potential and alternative protector of human rights. This 
constellation constitutes a more direct challenge to the disposition of tort 
                                                                                                       
253 TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *16-17 (2015) (Isr.). 
254 Normally in Israel, court fees for a civil suit amount to 2.5 percent of the total sum 
sought by the plaintiff for compensation, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Court 
Regulations. Court Regulations (Fees), 2007, KT 6579 p. 720 (Isr.). Attorney fees are 
also paid in advance. Id.  
255 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in 
Hindsight, 19 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 89, 89-92 (1995). 
256 Geraldine Pratt, Abandoned Women and Spaces of the Exception, 37 ANTIPODE 1052, 
1062 (2005). 
257 Michael E. Schrader, Competition and Convenience: The Emerging Role of 
Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. L.J. 347, 359 (1992). 
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law in relation to other legal branches of law available to wage the struggle 
to secure the hu(wo)man right to equality.258 
To this end, a theory regarding the relations between tort law and 
constitutional law in contexts of overlapping relevance is what is at stake. 
The tort route and the constitutional route can operate in either a 
complementary, that is, in addition to the use of tort claims, or a mutually 
exclusive way, that is, one employing suspension of the constitutional right. 
Under the notion of complementarity, constitutional law acts as the 
metaphoric shield by protecting women’s rights, while tort law acts as the 
metaphoric sword by allowing women to receive compensation for 
violations of those rights. The plaintiff can then make a strategic choice 
with regard to how both routes may be deployable at the same time. If she is 
being suppressed, excluded, and placed at a great power disadvantage, then 
the plaintiff may want to use the “shield,” that is, the constitutional route to 
nullify or diminish the harm done to her. If, on the other hand, she has more 
time and wishes to be more precise against the particular actor causing her 
the harm, she may choose to use the sword, that is, the torts route. These 
actions might seem sequential, but they are not. In keeping with the 
metaphor, they are means in combat to be used in the order and frequency 
of the plaintiff’s choosing, always available to her and always 
complementary. The complementarity of tort law encapsulated in its 
synchronic usability, along with other available legal redresses, puts the 
injured plaintiff at the forefront, allowing her the legal choice she deserves, 
as the person whose rights were abridged. 259  This empowerment is 
specifically essential to women because in the third stage of the 
evolutionary development articulated in this article, women plaintiffs find 
                                                                                                       
258 Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic 
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 408 (2001). 
259 In this respect, the complementary way lies at the heart of what can be referred to as 
Social Justice Theory of Tort Law. This theory, in a nutshell, advocates the importance of 
using tort law as a means to promote a women’s own sentiments as to social matters. 
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themselves mid-battle, suddenly told that the normal rules have been 
suspended, and they must now choose between sword and shield to sustain 
their human rights. 
Vulnerability theory to torts, developed and advocated elsewhere, would 
support the complementarity solution. Moreover, this theory would 
advocate its application to an extent that goes beyond even the 
constitutional-tort interplay towards diverse fields of law that may overlap 
with tort law regarding to women’s basic rights. 260  Torts vulnerability 
theory is premised on the idea that tort law should serve to eliminate 
abusive social power relations and compensate victims for these relations’ 
inferred harms. The theory advocates the compensation of those parties who 
sustained their harms through their tortfeasors’ abuse of the power relations 
within which the parties interact.261 Untraditional as it is, this theory draws 
on the notion of “reciprocity” introduced in George Fletcher’s well-known 
and accepted theory of tort law. Reciprocity focuses tort liability on the 
degree of risk that the parties in a lawsuit impose on each other, advocating 
the imposition of liability only when the risk taken by the tortfeasor against 
the victim exceeds the degree of risk normally inflicted by people in 
society, that is, non-reciprocal risk.262 Fletcher submits that this perception 
of unwanted risk-taking offers better protection of individual interests than 
the paradigm of reasonableness, which assigns liability based on a 
utilitarian calculus. 263  This social understanding is what justifies the 
imposition of tort liability in cases where the tortfeasor inflicts harm on the 
victim through the exercise of a risk that is not reciprocal in nature, or risk 
                                                                                                       
260 ASHER FLYNN, NICOLA HENRY & ANASTASIA POWELL, RAPE JUSTICE: BEYOND THE 
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548 (1972). 
         Suspension, Hu(wo)man Rights and Torts 721 
VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 3 • 2016 
that despite being “reciprocal” was not reasonably executed, and therefore 
constitutes negligent behavior.264 
Pursuant to Fletcher’s ideas, vulnerability theory identifies discrimination 
with nonreciprocal risks and maintains that negligence law should serve to 
impose liability on tortfeasors vis-à-vis victims of their discriminatory 
acts.265 The power relations existing between the rival parties are rendered 
nonreciprocal, and whenever the abuse of these relations triggers dispute, 
vulnerability theory calls for the imposition of liability on the victim's 
abuser.266 This theory’s main concern, in accordance with the liberal stance 
on basic liberties, lies with power relations characterized as “suspect,” that 
is, as reflecting “old and bad” discriminatory relationships based on race, 
sex, religion, and disability. 267  Such power relations lie at the heart of 
heinous social structures that endanger the wholesomeness of democracy, 
and therefore justify the harnessing of the tort-law mechanism for 
protecting society against the harm inflicted upon it.268 
Although vulnerability theory brings into account the general social 
structure within which power relations might render a discriminatory 
behavior “non-reciprocal,” vulnerability theory still remains within the 
bounds of the bilateral dispute splitting the parties.269 In light of this fact, 
this theory is especially suitable for accommodating the challenge that 
suspension poses to women’s rights. Due to its focus on power relations, it 
would point to the harms inflicted upon the women in the cases presented 
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above as representing exactly the kind of abuse imposed on women within 
the social context of the systemic inferiority they bear in relation to men.270 
The imposition of tort liability in such circumstances, as the cases presented 
above indicate, is not only allowed but also imperative. Thus, vulnerability 
theory dictates a transformative opposite reaction in the way tort law 
functions in these situations, where women are deprived of their 
constitutional right to equality. The basic idea of tort liability here—
securing equality in a reality of power relations271—would be frustrated by 
suspending rather than complementing other means for protecting 
hu(wo)men’s rights. 
The Nilly Philip v. Municipality of Beit-Shemesh case provides a great 
example of the complementary nature of tort law when a tort suit is being 
used to compensate women for deprivation of equality as an alternative to 
the administrative branch’s failure to protect them. In Nilly Philip, the 
women plaintiffs filed a tort action against their municipality claiming 
damages for the harm they sustained as a result of public advertisements 
ordering women in the city to be modest while walking the city’s streets.272 
The signage, addressing women alone, stipulated that “[w]omen 
visiting/working/shopping in our neighborhood are required to respect the 
sentiments of our residents, who are faithful to God and his Torah and 
ARRIVE in MODEST DRESS, which includes: buttoned up, long sleeved 
blouse , long skirt – no pants allowed – not wearing tight or see-through 
garments” (bold caps in the original).273 Another sign was more bluntly 
phrased and aimed, as I have claimed before, to abolish any female presence 
in the city streets: “Women are requested to REFRAIN FROM 
PASSING/PAUSING BY THIS SIDE WALK” (bold caps in the 
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original).274 The women-plaintiffs brought their claim under the negligence 
tort, 275  and the court’s elegant and clear analysis showcases tort law’s 
potential as yet another tool in fighting sex discrimination given the colossal 
failure of the public entities, such as the police and the municipality, to 
protect women’s right to equality and human dignity.276 The court used its 
decision to enumerate the public entities’ failure as well as to establish their 
negligent behavior, that is, their failure to act reasonably, as expected from 
a public entity committed to equality. A reasonable response to the 
abridgement of the plaintiffs’ right to equality, the court submitted, would 
have been to act swiftly to ensure the removal of the signage as well as 
assure that the women are not accosted and are not required to follow the 
instructions the signage contained.277 
The court suggested a public-private disposition, which accords with a 
complementary rather than suspension approach. It offers to use tort law as 
a means of protecting women’s rights where the public system has not done 
so itself. 278  According to the court, the women repeatedly sought the 
protection of the municipality and the police against the atmosphere of 
                                                                                                       
274 Both signs were depicted in the court’s decision, and were brought as examples of 
many other such signs placed across the city. Id. ¶ 11, 17. 
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discrimination, intimidation, and humiliation suffered as a result of that 
misogynic signage.279 The plaintiff’s complaints about incidents of bigotry 
and assault were not treated properly,280 and their sense of being constantly 
under threat in the public sphere grew stronger.281 Ultimately, the signs 
were kept mostly intact, and in the few cases where they were actually 
removed, ultra-orthodox men quickly reinstated them without any proper 
reaction by the authorities.282 
Interestingly, the police and the municipality declared that they were 
taking measures to resolve the situation by trying to negotiate with the ultra-
orthodox community, and the court did not use these facts to stall tort 
proceedings.283 Rather, the court pointed to the authorities themselves as 
those who violated the women’s right to protection, thereby rejecting the 
authorities’ submission that trying to resolve the issue through negotiation 
had justified the violation of the women’s rights and the authorities’ own 
unreasonable behavior as tortfeasors. 284  This critical judgment granted 
against the police and the municipality further underlined the court’s 
assessment of the harm sustained by the women. 
[T]he defendants’ behavior. . .suffices to contribute to the 
plaintiffs’ emotional distress and to add another layer to it. Beyond 
the insult and harm, it brings about. . .a heavy realization that the 
authorized public entities had deserted the plaintiffs and women as 
a whole in allowing the ongoing violation of their rights, and were 
prepared to allow a reality in which parts of the city were not 
subjected to the rule of law in a manner that may be interpreted as 
an acceptance of this state of affairs. . .this behavior and disregard 
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[for women’s rights] aggravated their sense of insult and 
vulnerability.285 
These court's harsh words, originally aimed at the executive entities, are 
also applicable to the judiciary itself as was presented in the cases discussed 
in this paper. The judges who decided the Regan and Bizchutan cases, and 
used tort claims for suspending women’s rights, acted with striking 
similarity to the court in the above description.286 Regardless of the court’s 
good intentions in availing women the tortious route and using it in a 
revolutionary fashion to protect their human rights, the court brought about 
a destructive result where tortious claims were used for suspending 
women’s rights. Women’s claims under tort law should thus function as an 
addition to protecting their rights, and not as a mere substitute for their 
rights. Tortious rights should complement and deepen the protection 
provided to human rights by constitutional law and public entities, rather 
than rendering these remedies mutually exclusive. Complementarity 
facilitates a comprehensive and holistic legal system committed to the 
protection and advancement of human rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the tremendous role tort law is gradually assuming in waging the 
fight to protect human rights by using as many legal tools as possible, this 
positive trend also bears some dangerous implications. After a decade of 
women using tort claims in creative manners that clearly benefitted women 
and bettered their inferior social as well as legal status, these same claims 
are now turning into a mutually exclusive alternative, a substitute, rather 
than an independent and additional tool for bolstering women’s rights. 
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The destructive turn that created the suspension, and thus made tort and 
constitutional remedies mutually exclusive, was at times an explicit effort to 
block women from reclaiming equality where it was taken away from them, 
as in the get cases brought before the rabbinical courts.287 At other times, 
like in the Regan and Bizchutan cases, referral to tort law was made as an 
effort aimed at equipping women with another tool to assist them in gaining 
redress through the private legal sphere. 288  In both methodologies, a 
worrying similar effect emerged, one that suspends women’s basic rights 
and privatizes their right to redress in the public sphere too. As Agamben’s 
political philosophy suggests, this trend places women in a state of 
exception where their rights are violated by the liberal state in which the 
rule of law should allegedly prevail.289 Women’s experience in the added 
third stage adds a more nuanced perspective to Agamben’s theory, 
contextualizing it and pointing to the peculiar and more harmful manner in 
which the theory applies to women.290 Taking away their right to choose 
between a civil lawsuit and a constitutional claim, by suspending their right 
to pursue one of these paths and the forced privatization of their public 
struggle, burdens women with the role of being the private general attorneys 
and executors of the basic rights that the state should have secured for them. 
Although this trend is identified as taking place in the Israeli legal 
system, it also bears implications for many other common law systems. The 
suspension of women’s rights and their privatization by the liberal state as a 
pragmatic political response is expected to prosper. This article should serve 
as a warning sign to this trend worldwide. 
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